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INTRODUCTION
The global interests of protecting public health and of liberalizing
1
trade frequently intersect and conflict. Recently, certain Members of
2
the World Trade Organization (“WTO”) have banned the import of
3
4
5
cigarettes, asbestos, and hormone-treated meat on public health

1. See, e.g., WTO: India Down on Doha Draft Declaration, Threatens to Leave WTO to
Protest Agenda, BNA INT’L TRADE DAILY NEWS, Nov. 5, 2001, at 10 (outlining an Indian
claim that certain WTO provisions prevent nations from ensuring affordable
medicine to protect public health); Food Safety: Food Safety Concerns Emerging as Hurdle
to Launch of New Round, BNA INT’L TRADE DAILY NEWS, July 30, 2001, at 12 (detailing
conflict between the European Union and the United States over trade-restrictive
food safety regulations based on uncertain evidence of health risks); WTO Ministerial:
Massive Union Rally Urges Support for Worker Concerns in WTO Accords, BNA INT’L TRADE
DAILY NEWS, Dec. 1, 1999, at 5 (summarizing fears of labor activists that national and
state regulations of public health will be subjected to a “global veto” by WTO); Wood
Packaging: Hong Kong Registers WTO Complaint Over U.S. Wood Crate Ban; Canada to
Follow, BNA INT’L TRADE DAILY NEWS, Nov. 13, 1998, at 8 (elaborating the United
States and other Members’ claims that a Swiss law prohibiting hormone-treated beef
and poultry imports on public health grounds is unscientific and politicallymotivated).
2. See Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
[hereinafter WTO Agreement], arts. XI, XII, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS—RESULTS OF THE
URUGUAY ROUND vol. 31, 33 I.L.M. 1226 (1994) (requiring all ratifying Members to
accept agreements settled at the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations). Between
1986 and 1994, the negotiators at the Uruguay Round created an intergovernmental
organization (the WTO) that would enshrine the principles of the previous General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (the GATT) relating to the trade in goods while
adding agreements on trade in services, trade-related intellectual property, dispute
settlement, and other supplemental agreements. See generally RAJ BHALA & KEVIN
KENNEDY, WORLD TRADE LAW 8-15 (1998) (explaining WTO’s creation and mandate).
3. See GATT Panel Report on Thailand—Restrictions on Importation of and
Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, Nov. 7, 1990, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.), at 200
(1990) [hereinafter Thai Cigarettes] (Thailand banned imports of foreign cigarettes
and tobacco products on the grounds that the measure protected its citizens from
health risks associated with foreign cigarettes).
4. WTO Appellate Body Report on European Communities—Measures
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6

grounds. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”),
the central legal text of the WTO, provides that WTO Members
7
(“Members”) should not place quantitative restrictions on trade
because each Member has agreed to grant reciprocal access to their
8
For this reason, Members who export these harmful
markets.
9
products complain that the trade restrictions violate the GATT.
Under GATT Article XX(b), however, such violations are permissible
when the disputed measure is “necessary for the protection of human
10
11
health” and not a “disguised restriction on international trade.” In
theory, this exception should protect measures taken by a Member
12
acting in good faith to protect human health.
The debate over how to liberalize trade while preventing child
labor raises the issue of balancing a nation’s sovereignty against the
health of its citizens. Child labor certainly poses the kind of serious

Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12,
2001) [hereinafter EU Asbestos] (France banned imports of asbestos on the grounds
that the measure protected its citizens from health risks posed by asbestos), available
at http://docsonline.wto.org (last visited Feb. 14, 2002).
5. See WTO Appellate Body Report on European Communities—Measures
Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R,
WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter Beef Hormones] (E.U. banned
hormone-treated meat imports on the grounds that the measure protected its
citizens from various health risks), available at http://docsonline.wto.org (last visited
Feb. 14, 2002).
6. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11,
T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT]. During the Uruguay Round,
negotiators proposed revisions of the 1947 version of the GATT and also decided to
draft new side agreements on specific GATT-related issues. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET
AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASES, MATERIALS AND
TEXT 290-91 (3d ed. 1995) (discussing how the WTO amended the GATT). The
revised main document, GATT 1994, is essentially the same as the 1947 version with
some modifications made by the Uruguay Round negotiators. See WTO Agreement,
supra note 2, at Annex 1A (incorporating GATT 1947 into the WTO). A WTO
dispute settlement body enforces GATT 1947 unless GATT 1994 or another WTO
Agreement amends the relevant provision. See BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 1215 (addressing the effect of the Uruguay Round on dispute settlement
interpretation). In this Comment, a reference to GATT will mean GATT 1947 unless
otherwise noted.
7. See WTO Agreement, supra note 2, art. I (transforming the “contracting
parties” of GATT, a provisional contract, into “Members” of the WTO, a permanent
institution).
8. See GATT, supra note 6, art. XI (prohibiting trade restrictions other than
duties, taxes, or other charges); WTO Agreement, supra note 2, at pmbl.
(committing importing Members to granting non-discriminatory market access to
exporting Members while promoting sustainable development).
9. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text (citing cases where complaining
Members have brought dispute settlement claims against other Members for
restricting trade on health grounds).
10. GATT, supra note 6, art. XX(b).
11. Id. art. XX chapeau. In this Comment, a reference to the GATT Article XX
chapeau will mean a reference to the introductory sentence of Article XX.
12. See infra notes 79-80 and accompanying text (explaining use of the
Exceptions Clause).

MITRO.PRINTER.DOC

1226

10/2/2002 2:38 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51: 1223

human health risk that is difficult for the international community to
13
ignore. Nonetheless, the trading community has yet to pay serious
attention to child labor as a public health issue despite widespread
14
agreement on its dangers. In 1994, the World Health Organization
(“WHO”) estimated that occupational accidents injure 100 million
15
workers and kill 200,000 each year. Additionally, each year 68-157
million new cases of occupational disease are attributed to hazardous
16
In 1997, the International Labor
exposures and workloads.
Organization (“ILO”) surveyed many of the countries that employ
17
child labor routinely. The ILO studies indicate that more than twothirds (69%) of child laborers in some countries are exposed to
18
workplace hazards. National surveys in several countries have shown

13. See generally Kristin Weldon, Piercing the Silence or Lulling You to Sleep: The
Sounds of Child Labor, 7 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 227, 227 (2001) (noting the efforts of
international organizations and countries to eliminate child labor); David M. Smolin,
Conflict and Ideology in the International Campaign Against Child Labour, 16 HOFSTRA
LAB. & EMP. L.J. 383, 419 (1999) (recognizing that the vast majority of nations have
agreed to abolish child labor, but that nations disagree fundamentally on
enforcement of the abolition); Anjli Garg, Note, Child Labor Social Clause: Analysis and
Proposal for Action, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 473, 484-86 (1999) (citing opinion
polls that show that the public in many nations opposes trade in goods produced by
child labor); Kebebew Ashagrie, Statistics on Working Children and Hazardous Child
Labour In Brief, International Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour,
International Labour Office, Geneva (rev. Apr. 1998) [hereinafter Ashagrie, Working
Children Statistics] (estimating that half of all children work full-time and that three in
every hundred children stop working because of debilitating work injuries),
available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/ipec/simpoc/stats/
child/stats.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2002). In this Comment, a reference to “child
labor” will mean labor harmful to the health or development of children as defined
by ILO 182 and/or the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child unless otherwise
noted. See ILO Convention 182, Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, June 17, 1999, art. 3(d), 38 I.L.M.
1207 [hereinafter ILO 182] (prohibiting work likely to harm the health and safety of
children), available at http://ilolex.ilo.ch:1567/english/convdisp1.htm (last visited
Feb. 14, 2002); Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 44/25, U.N. GAOR,
44th Sess., Supp. No. 49, art. 32(1), U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989), adopted Nov. 20,
1989, entered into force Sept. 2, 1990, reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1448 (1989) [hereinafter
UN Child Convention] (“States Parties recognize the right of the child to be
protected from . . . performing any work that is likely to be . . . harmful to the
child’s health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development.”), available
at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/k2crc.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2002).
14. See infra notes 15-19 and accompanying text (discussing occupational health
hazards).
15. World Health Organization, Declaration on Occupational Health For All (Oct. 14,
1994) (referring to occupational health as one of the most important factors in
improving the health of the world’s population), available at http://www.who.int/
environmental_information/Occuphealth/declarationang.htm (last visited Feb. 14,
2002).
16. See id. (emphasizing disparate effect on developing world where seventy
percent of the world’s workers reside).
17. See Ashagrie, Working Children Statistics, supra note 13 (citing results of surveys
conducted in twenty-six countries).
18. See id. (reporting that hazards are due primarily to biological, chemical, and
environmental sources).
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that more than twenty percent of working children suffer workplace
19
injuries.
The Pakistan brick-kiln industry vividly demonstrates the physical
20
damage children suffer from excessive and unsafe labor. Seema, a
21
nine-year-old girl, works many hours every day making mud bricks.
For some time, she has had a serious eye infection that is aggravated
22
by constant exposure to the fumes of the brick-kiln. Her family
23
cannot afford to send her to a doctor for treatment. Unfortunately,
24
Seema’s condition is not unusual. Because children in the brick
kiln industry inhale fine clay dust and noxious gases from the kilns,
they suffer fifty percent more chronic illnesses than their
25
counterparts in other villages. Although these children begin work
at dawn and work into the late afternoon in more than 100-degree
26
heat during the hot season, they are not paid for their toil.
Children comprise a large proportion of Pakistani brick-kiln workers
27
Despite this harmful
and suffer from a high mortality rate.
production process, the United States currently permits the
28
importation of these bricks.
To address the problem of child labor, the U.S. Congress passed
29
the Trade and Development Act of 2000 (“TDA” or “the Act”). The

19. Kebebew Ashagrie, Youngest Workers and Hazardous Child Labour, International
Programme on the Elimination of Child Labour, International Labour Office,
Youngest
Workers],
at
Geneva
(1999)
[hereinafter
Ashagrie,
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/ipec/simpoc/stats/child/
summary.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2002).
20. See generally FARHAD KARIM, CONTEMPORARY FORMS OF SLAVERY IN PAKISTAN
(Human Rights Watch, 1995) (detailing abusive child labor practices in Pakistani
export industries).
21. See id. at 44 (recounting an interview by Human Rights Watch/Asia at a brickkiln on the outskirts of Lahore in October 1993).
22. See id. (describing Seema’s illnesses and their causes).
23. Id.
24. See id. at 43 (“[A]fflictions common among child brick-kiln workers include
deteriorating eyesight and even blindness.”).
25. Dr. Tufael Mohammad Khan, CHILDREN OF THE BRICK KILNS IN NORTHWEST
FRONTIER PROVINCE (Peshawar: UNICEF, 1990), cited in KARIM, supra note 20, at 43.
26. See National Commission for Child Welfare and Development, Special
Education and Social Welfare Division, Government of Pakistan and UNICEF,
DISCOVER THE WORKING CHILD, at 16 (Pakistan, 1990) (explaining that children of
Pakistani brick-kilns also frequently suffer psychological trauma), cited in KARIM, supra
note 20, at 44.
27. See id. (referring to UN reports presented to the Pakistani government
illustrating long hours worked by young children, often between six and eight years
of age).
28. See United States Customs Service, Convict/Forced/Indentured Labor
Issuances, Detention Orders and Findings [hereinafter Customs Detention Orders]
(failing to include Pakistani hand-made bricks on list of products prohibited from
entering the United States because of the use of child labor in production), available
at http://www.customs.gov/enforcem/dofindin.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2002).
29. Pub. L. No. 106-200, 114 Stat. 251 (codified in scattered sections of 19
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majority of the legislation grants preferential trading terms to
30
A more discrete but equally important
developing countries.
31
32
section of the TDA amends Section 307 of the 1930 Tariff Act. The
TDA amendment prohibits imports made by indentured or forced
33
34
child labor. Pursuant to an Executive Order, in January 2001 the
Departments of Labor, State, and Treasury prohibited federal
contractors from using Pakistani hand-made bricks because they are
“mined, produced, or manufactured by forced or indentured child
35
labor.”
Under the TDA, the U.S. Customs Service (“Customs”)
could similarly classify Pakistani bricks and deny their importation
36
into the United States.
If its bricks did not gain market access in the United States,
37
Pakistan might assert at the WTO dispute settlement body that the
38
This Comment
TDA violates a number of GATT provisions.
contends that the United States could successfully invoke GATT

U.S.C.) (designed to encourage trade with developing nations and to condition some
trade on the improvement of child labor indicators in those nations).
30. See id. §§ 111-116, 201-203, 211-213 (granting trade preferences to African
and Caribbean nations).
31. See id. § 411(a) (amending 19 U.S.C. § 1307 and defining “forced labor
and/or indentured labor” to include “forced or indentured child labor”).
32. Tariff Act of 1930, ch. 497, § 307, 46 Stat. 590, 689-90 (codified as amended
at 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (2000)) (authorizing Treasury Secretary to deny entry of goods
“produced or manufactured wholly or in part in any foreign country by convict labor
or/and forced labor or/and indentured labor”).
33. Id.; see also Trade and Development Act § 411(a) (clarifying that child labor
now falls under the purview of Section 307).
34. Exec. Order No. 13,126, 64 Fed. Reg. 32,383 (June 12, 1999), reprinted in 41
U.S.C. § 35 (1994 & Supp. V 1999).
35. Bureau of International Labor Affairs: Notice of Final List of Products
Requiring Federal Contractor Certification as to Forced or Indentured Child Labor
Under Executive Order Number 13,126, 66 Fed. Reg. 5353, 5356 (Jan. 18, 2001).
36. See id. at 5353 (commenting that “the definition of ‘forced or indentured
child labor’ . . . is derived from, and generally consistent with, the Tariff Act of
1930.”); see also U.S. CUSTOMS SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FORCED CHILD
LABOR ADVISORY 6-7 (2000) (noting that “employment to discharge a debt” and
“employment of very young children” are “red flag” indicators of forced or
indentured child labor). The Advisory also identifies Department of Labor reports
on child labor and Department of State documents on human rights as sources of
information that the Customs Service will consider when certifying products made by
child labor. Id. app. B.
37. See WTO Agreement, supra note 2, arts. 4-6, Annex 2 [hereinafter DSU]
(outlining procedures for WTO Members attempting to resolve complaints). DSU
Article 4 requires that Members first attempt to come to a mutual settlement of their
dispute through good faith consultations. Id. art. 4. DSU Article 5 allows Members
to voluntarily submit their dispute to conciliation and mediation by the WTO. Id.
art. 5. DSU Article 6 permits the complaining Member to request the establishment
of a WTO Panel, composed of individuals from a list of experienced practitioners, to
settle the dispute. Id. art. 6. DSU Article 17 establishes a permanent WTO Appellate
Body to hear appeals from Panel decisions. Id. art. 17.
38. See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (suggesting that Pakistan might
assert violations of GATT Articles I, XI, and XIII).
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39

Article XX(b) to justify a Section 307 import restraint imposed for
40
the purpose of counteracting and preventing child labor violations.
The international community recognizes collectively that many forms
41
of child labor pose a serious health risk. This recognition vindicates
the United States’ use of unilateral and extraterritorial measures
42
applied in a non-discriminatory fashion. Lastly, it is preferable to
justify the TDA under Article XX(b) rather than Article XX(a)
(which protects “public morals”) simply because the WTO Appellate
43
44
Body (“WTOAB”) has yet to interpret Article XX(a).
Part I of this Comment explains the evolution of the trade and
labor debate within the GATT/WTO system. Part II outlines how the
WTO and GATT dispute settlement bodies have interpreted Article
XX exceptions, both before and after incorporating the interpretive
standards of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”
45
or “Vienna Convention”). Part III contends that the policy objective
and design of the TDA fall under the Article XX(b) public health
exception. To do so, the import prohibition employed by the TDA
must be “necessary” to achieving its policy objective, which is the
elimination of forced child labor. Part IV considers whether the Act,

39. See 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (2000) (prohibiting the importation of products made
with convict labor, forced or indentured labor, and authorizing the Secretary of the
Treasury to prescribe regulations for the enforcement of the provision).
40. Infra notes 376-78.
41. See supra note 13 and accompanying text (providing the ILO 182 and UN
Child Convention definitions of child labor); see also International Labour
Organization, Ratifications of ILO Convention 182 [hereinafter ILO 182
Ratifications] (listing 117 signatories to ILO 182), available at http://webfusion.
ilo.org/public/db/standards/normes/appl/index.cfm (last updated Apr. 7, 2002);
United Nations, Ratifications of Convention on the Rights of the Child [hereinafter
UN Child Convention Ratifications] (listing 191 signatories to UN Child
Convention), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/k2crc.htm (last
updated Feb. 8, 2002).
42. See infra notes 376-78 (concluding that fairly applying the TDA sufficiently
addresses international child labor concerns).
43. See discussion supra note 37 (describing the dispute settlement procedure in
the WTO, particularly the establishment of a permanent Appellate Body).
44. See Steve Charnovitz, The Moral Exception in Trade Policy, 38 VA. J. INT’L L. 689,
744 (1998) [hereinafter Charnovitz, Moral Exception] (stating that the “public morals”
exception of Article XX(a) must be assembled because no dispute settlement body
has interpreted it). Charnovitz argues that Article XX(a), which permits measures
“necessary to protect public morals,” would justify an import prohibition on child
labor products because child labor is widely-condemned internationally as a moral
abomination. Id.; GATT, supra note 6, art. XX(a). This Comment generally dovetails
with Professor Charnovitz’s conclusion but capitalizes on the persuasiveness of recent
WTOAB decisions interpreting Article XX(b) and the more explicit recognition of
child labor as a health issue (rather than a moral issue) in international treaties and
organizations. See supra notes 148-60, 199-206 and accompanying text (describing
the international consensus on the health risks of child labor and the effects of the
WTOAB decision in Asbestos).
45. May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, T.S. No. 58 (entered into force Jan. 27,
1980), reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
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if applied as proposed by the United States Customs Service, meets
the requirements of the chapeau of Article XX. Using the import
ban on Pakistani bricks as a hypothetical example of how and when
the TDA could be implemented, this Comment concludes that the
46
TDA would survive scrutiny by a WTO Panel if applied evenhandedly and applied based on an internationally accepted
definition of child labor.
I.

THE TRADE AND LABOR DEBATE WITHIN THE GATT/WTO SYSTEM

After World War II, the world faced the task of rehabilitating its
47
major economic powers and establishing political order. The theory
48
of comparative advantage instructed policymakers that reducing
49
trade barriers would promote economic stability. If every country
dedicated resources to its most efficient industries, the products of
those industries could be traded for goods from like-minded
countries and both trading partners could achieve net economic
50
gains. Under the comparative advantage theory, these gains would
accomplish both economic and political goals, specifically, reducing
51
poverty and promoting peace.
To perform this task, the major trading powers negotiated the
52
creation of the International Trade Organization (“ITO”).
The
purpose of the ITO resembled that of the WTO: to create an
53
institution to maintain and enforce the GATT trading system. The

46. See discussion supra note 37 (describing the dispute settlement procedure in
the WTO, particularly the establishment of Panels).
47. See JACKSON et al., supra note 6, at 1-6 (summarizing the rise of the GATT
system and the vehement international reaction to the U.S. Tariff Act of 1930).
48. See CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS, 17-21, 27, 33 (5th
ed. 1973), reprinted in JACKSON et al., supra note 6, at 8-12 (providing a thorough
discussion of the economic theory of comparative advantage).
49. See JACKSON et al., supra note 6, at 5 (describing consensus among national
leaders that promoting trade would be mutually advantageous).
50. See CHARLES P. KINDLEBERGER, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 17-21, 27, 33 (5th
ed. 1973), reprinted in JACKSON et al., supra note 6, at 8-12 (explaining comparative
advantage theory).
51. See Robert E. Hudec, GATT Legal Restraints on the Use of Trade Measures Against
Foreign Environmental Practices, in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION 108 (Jagdish
Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996) (contending that the GATT provided both
for the economic growth of post-WWII nations and the establishment of an improved
system of international relations).
52. See BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 2, § 1(a) (summarizing the comprehensive
politico-economic plan that created the Bretton Woods triad of institutions). The
triad would have included the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, and
International Trade Organization, but the ITO never came into being. Id.; see also
infra note 56 and accompanying text (explaining why the ITO faltered).
53. See JACKSON et al., supra note 6, at 302 (comparing the objectives of the ITO
and WTO). Professor Jackson notes that, while the ITO would have included a
considerable range and volume of rules regarding international economic behavior,
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Havana Charter of 1948, the founding document and blueprint for
both the ITO and the GATT, provided that “[m]embers
recognize . . . that all countries have a common interest in the
achievement and maintenance of fair labour standards related to
productivity, and thus in the improvement of wages and working
54
This wording never made its way into the GATT,
conditions.”
however, because its drafters limited the GATT to “traditional
55
commercial aspects of the trade in goods.” Because the ITO never
56
came into existence, the GATT did not retain the ITO fair labor
57
standards provisions. Instead, the GATT inherited only one explicit
labor-related exception from the Havana Charter: Article XX(e)
58
permits measures relating to prison labor.
Since 1953, the United States and like-minded nations have
intermittently pushed for the inclusion of a social clause in the
59
GATT that would include more explicit workers’ rights protections
60
that could be enforced through trade sanctions. At the Marrakesh

the WTO is a so-called “mini-charter” meant to evolve and change. Id.
54. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, PUB. NO. 3117, HAVANA CHARTER FOR AN INTERNATIONAL
TRADE ORGANIZATION 113, ch. II, art. 7 (1948); see also Virginia A. Leary, Workers’
Rights and International Trade: The Social Clause (GATT, ILO, NAFTA, U.S. Laws), in 2
FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION, supra note 51, at 198 (explaining that the ill-fated
ITO contained fair labor standards provisions that committed Members to the
elimination of “unfair labour conditions”).
55. See Leary, supra note 54, at 198 (implying that drafters of Havana Charter
intended the GATT to govern commercial transactions and the ITO to govern traderelated labor issues).
56. See BHALA & KENNEDY, supra note 2, § 1(a) (submitting that the United
Nations received no acceptance of the Havana Charter from any nation because the
U.S. Senate made it clear that it would not agree to the ITO’s creation).
57. See Adelle Blackett, Whither Social Clause? Human Rights, Trade Theory and
Treaty Interpretation, 31 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 1, 7 (1999) (observing that the
demise of the ITO removed any explicit linkage between trade and labor rights).
58. See GATT, supra note 6, art. XX(e) (representing the only explicit reference
in the GATT to “labour”).
59. See Leary, supra note 54, at 199 (noting efforts made by the United States and
some European countries to include labor provisions in the GATT) (citing Steve
Charnovitz, The Influence of International Labour Standards on the World Trading Regime,
126 INT’L LABOUR REV. 565, 574-75 (1985)). See generally Administration Will Continue
to Press for Creation of Labor Group at WTO, 14 INT’L TRADE REP. (BNA), No. 1, at 14-15
(Jan. 1, 1997) (referring to the United States’ attempts to build on European
commitments to labor rights and introduce a labor clause at the WTO); Clinton
Administration Committed to Labor/Environment Link in WTO, 15 INT’L TRADE REP.
(BNA), No. 31, at 1351 (Aug. 5, 1998) (reiterating the Clinton Administration’s
desire to bring labor issues to the WTO forum, but noting significant barriers to
multilateral consensus).
60. See U.S. COMMISSION ON FOREIGN ECONOMIC POLICY, STAFF PAPERS 437-38
(1954), quoted in Janell M. Diller & David A. Levy, Note, Child Labor, Trade and
Investment: Toward the Harmonization of International Law, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 663, 685-86
(1997) (recounting a U.S. proposal to add a social clause that would make the
“maintenance of labor conditions below those which the productivity of the industry
and the economy at large would justify” a nullification and impairment of another
nation’s benefits under GATT Article XXIII, thus triggering a potential dispute
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61

Ministerial Conference in 1994, negotiators hotly disputed the
62
linkage of trade and labor standards. The Chairman of the Trade
Negotiations Committee eventually concluded that no consensus
63
existed among participants on the issue. In his concluding remarks,
the Chairman merely reiterated that “ministers . . . stressed the
importance they attach to their requests for an examination of the
relationship between the trading system and internationally
64
After the Marrakesh Ministerial
recognized labour standards.”
Conference, the GATT contracting parties agreed to form a
permanent organization (the WTO) with the GATT as its central
65
legal text.
At the 1996 Ministerial Conference in Singapore, Members
acknowledged the significant role of trade in promoting core labor
66
standards. Although deciding against forming a working party on
67
trade and labor, the Members agreed to encourage collaboration

settlement on the labor rights issue). See generally Blackett, supra note 57, at 79-80
(suggesting that the social clause be grafted onto the WTO by allowing labor rights
violations to be enforced through the WTO dispute settlement procedure).
61. See discussion supra note 2 (explaining the Marrakesh Ministerial
Conference); see also WTO Agreement, supra note 2, art. IV (requiring that a
Ministerial Conference composed of all WTO Members be held at least every two
years to make decisions on pertinent matters and to put forth the WTO work
program).
62. See generally Leary, supra note 54, at 198-99 (spelling out the course of the
trade and labor debate at Marrakesh, during which developing countries argued
against an explicit link between labor standards and trade); Statements by J.P.
Delamuraz (Switzerland), Michael Kantor (United States), Theodore Pangalos
(Presidency of the Council of the European Communities), Sir Leon Brittan
(Commission of European Communities), Vice President Al Gore (United States),
Marrakesh Ministerial Conference, MTN.TNC/MIN(4)/ST/74, 4, 107 (Apr. 12-14,
1994), cited in Leary, supra note 54, at 199 n.47 (arguing forcefully for explicit
recognition of labor standards in Marrakesh Final Act).
63. See infra note 64 and accompanying text (citing concluding remarks of
Marrakesh Conference’s Trade Negotiations Chairman).
64. Concluding Remarks of H.E. Sergio Abreu Bonilla, Chairman of the Trade
Negotiations Committee, Multilateral Trade Negotiations of the Uruguay Round at
Marrakesh, MTN.TNC/MIN(94)/6 (Apr. 15, 1994), quoted in Leary, supra note 54, at
199.
65. See WTO Agreement, supra note 2, art. I (establishing the World Trade
Organization); id. Annex 1A (formally incorporating GATT 1947 into GATT 1994).
66. See Singapore Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(96)/DEC (Dec.
13, 1996), reprinted in 36 I.L.M. 220, 221 (1997) [hereinafter Singapore Declaration],
available at http://docsonline.wto.org (last visited Feb. 14, 2002)
We renew our commitment to the observance of internationally recognized
core labour standards. The International Labor Organization is the
competent body to set and deal with these standards, and we affirm our
support for its work in promoting them . . . [and] [w]e reject the use of
labour standards for protectionist purposes and agree that the comparative
advantage of countries, particularly low-wage developing countries, must in
no way be put into question.
Id.
67. Compare id. (omitting any language regarding the establishment of a formal
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68

between the WTO and the ILO. Most importantly, the Members did
not exclude the possibility that the WTOAB might enforce labor
69
standards. Instead, the Singapore Declaration concluded that the
ILO should merely “set and deal with,” but not necessarily enforce,
70
labor standards.
Since Singapore, the United States and other Members have
71
sought to expand the labor rights agenda. At the Doha Ministerial

body to pursue a relationship with the ILO), with Singapore Ministerial Conference,
Statement by Sir Leon Brittan Q.C., Vice-President of the European Commission,
Statement at Singapore Ministerial Conference, Commission of the European
Communities, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(96)/ST/2 (Dec. 13, 1996) (expressing EU
position that the Singapore Declaration should form the basis for future discussion
of labor standards in the WTO), available at http://docsonline.wto.org (last visited
Feb. 14, 2002), and Singapore Ministerial Conference, Statement by the Honourable
Charlene Barshefsky, Acting United States Trade Representative, United States,
WTO Doc. WT/MIN(96)/ST/5 (Dec. 13, 1996) (expressing the U.S. position that
the WTO should establish a work program to deal with labor issues), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org (last visited Feb. 14, 2002).
68. See Singapore Declaration, supra note 66 (describing the importance of
collaboration with the ILO); see also Drusilla K. Brown, A Transactions Cost Politics
Analysis of International Child Labor Standards, in SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF U.S. TRADE
POLICY 245, 263 (Alan K. Deardorff & Robert M. Stern eds., 2000) (concluding that
the separation of labor standards monitoring between the WTO and the ILO stems
from a lack of agreement among the principals over enforcement and standards).
69. See Singapore Declaration, supra note 66 (failing to provide explicitly that the
ILO should enforce labor standards).
70. Id.
71. See Preparations for the 1999 Seattle Ministerial Conference, Communication
from the United States, WTO’s Forward Work Programme: Proposed Establishment of a
Working Group on Trade and Labour, WTO Doc. WT/GC/W/382 (Oct. 30, 1999)
(proposing that the WTO establish a Working Group on Trade and Labor that would
examine, among other topics, “the extent of forced or exploitative child labour in
industries engaged in international trade”), available at http://docsonline.wto.org
(last visited Feb. 14, 2002); Geneva Ministerial Conference, United States, Statement
by the Honourable Charlene Barshefsky, Acting United States Trade Representative,
WTO Doc. WT/MIN(98)/ST/57 (May 18, 1998) [hereinafter Geneva Barshefsky
Statement] (advocating continued collaboration between the ILO and WTO, but
hinting that the ILO must prove itself as a leader in advocating the rights of
workers), available at http://docsonline.wto.org (last visited Feb. 14, 2002); see also
Seattle Ministerial Conference, Commission of the European Community, Statement
Circulated by Pascal Lamy, Commissioner for Trade, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(99)/ST/3
(Nov. 30, 1999) (suggesting creation of a carefully designed joint ILO/WTO forum
on trade and labor that would advance the Singapore Declaration and prevent the
possibility of protectionist sanctions), available at http://docsonline.wto.org (last
visited Feb. 14, 2002); Preparations for the 1999 Seattle Ministerial Conference,
Communication from the European Communities, Proposal for a Joint ILO/WTO
Standing Working Forum on Trade, Globalization and Labour Issues, WTO Doc.
WT/GC/W/383 (Oct. 30, 1999) (proposing an ILO/WTO Standing Working Forum
to promote labor rights without use of trade sanctions and commending ILO
progress in “banning the worst forms of child labour”), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org (last visited Feb. 14, 2002); Outcome of Summit of the
Americas and Prospects for Free Trade in the Hemisphere: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Trade, House Comm. on Ways and Means, 107th Cong. 34-35 (2001) (statement of
Robert B. Zoellick, U.S. Trade Rep.) (outlining Bush Administration commitment to
incentive-based programs and to strengthening specialized institutions such as the
ILO to promote labor standards), available at http://www.ustr.gov/speech-

MITRO.PRINTER.DOC

1234

10/2/2002 2:38 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51: 1223

Conference in 2001, the Ministers again failed to define the
72
WTO/ILO working relationship more clearly. Thus far, developing
nations have argued effectively that core labor rights provisions
actually disguise protectionist policies and erode the competitive
73
advantage developing nations enjoy in labor costs.
In response,
developed countries argue that, if structured to avoid protectionism,
74
fundamental labor rights can and should be included in the WTO.
Members have yet to agree on the integration of labor standards into
the WTO, but a dispute settlement challenge of a labor-related trade
75
law, like the TDA, could be an impetus for formal agreement.

test/zoellick/index.shtml (last visited Feb. 14, 2002); Robert B. Zoellick, The United
States, Europe and the World Trading System, Address Before The Kangaroo Group,
Strasbourg, France (May 15, 2001) (stressing that labor standards cannot be
protectionist and that trading partners must be sensitive to issues of sovereignty),
available at http://www.ustr.gov/speech-test/zoellick/index.shtml (last visited Feb.
14, 2002); Robert B. Zoellick, Press Conference at WTO Mini-Ministerial Meeting,
Mexico City, Mexico (Sept. 1, 2001) (contrasting Clinton Administration position on
labor standards with Bush Administration position that favors improving labor
standards by opening markets and encouraging growth), available at
http://www.ustr.gov/speech-test/zoellick/index.shtml (last visited Feb. 14, 2002).
But see Doha Ministerial Conference, United States, Statement by H.E. Robert B.
Zoellick, United States Trade Representative, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/ST/3 (Nov.
10, 2001) (omitting any reference to inclusion of labor rights in the WTO agenda),
available at http://docsonline.wto.org (last visited Feb. 14, 2002).
72. See Doha Ministerial Declaration, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1 (Nov. 14,
2001) (reaffirming the declaration of the Ministers at the Singapore Ministerial
Conference concerning core labor standards and noting the progress made by the
available
ILO
“on
the
social
dimension
of
globalization”),
at http://docsonline.wto.org (last visited Feb. 14, 2002).
73. See Leary, supra note 54, at 199 (noting the continuously strenuous protest of
developing nations to the addition of a social clause); see also Doha Ministerial
Conference, Communication from Cuba, Declaration of the Group of 77 and China
on the Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference at Doha, Qatar, WTO Doc. WT/L/424
(Oct. 22, 2001) (opposing any linkage between trade and labor standards and
exhibiting skepticism that concepts such as “global coherence” set forth by
intergovernmental organizations like the ILO will be used as vehicles for
protectionism), available at http://docsonline.wto.org (last visited Feb. 14, 2002);
Doha Ministerial Conference, Pakistan, Statement by H.E. Abdul Razak Dawood,
Minister for Commerce, Industries and Production, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/ST/6
(Nov. 10, 2001) (protesting that the underlying motive for the reference to labor
available
standards
in
the
Doha
Declaration
is
protectionism),
at http://docsonline.wto.org (last visited Feb. 14, 2002).
74. See Doha Ministerial Conference, Canada, Statement by the Honourable
Pierre S. Pettigrew, Minister for International Trade, WTO Doc.
WT/MIN(01)/ST/13 (Nov. 10, 2001) (expressing disappointment that Members
could not agree on a plan at Doha to ensure that the WTO works with the ILO to
advance labor standards), available at http://docsonline.wto.org (last visited Feb. 14,
2002); Doha Ministerial Conference, Sweden, Statement by H.E. Leif Pagrotsky,
Minister for Trade, WTO Doc. WT/MIN(01)/ST/119 (Nov. 10, 2001) (decrying
WTO Members who have made commitments to market access in the WTO and core
labor rights in the ILO but are unwilling to make concrete WTO support for the
ILO), available at http://docsonline.wto.org (last visited Feb. 14, 2002).
75. See infra note 399 and accompanying text (explaining how a dispute
settlement decision incorporating labor rights into the WTO does not necessarily
“diminish the rights” of WTO Members). A successful WTO defense of the TDA

MITRO.PRINTER.DOC

2002]

10/2/2002 2:38 PM

TRADE AND CHILD LABOR

1235

II. THE INTERPRETIVE HISTORY OF GATT ARTICLE XX FROM 1947 TO
THE PRESENT
Disputes over labor standards can be presented to a WTO Panel if
one Member allegedly restricted trade on the basis of a labor rights
76
principle.
When claiming injury, a complaining Member must
specify the GATT-related benefit being “nullified and impaired” by
77
the responding Member. Under WTO jurisprudence, an import
ban (like the one authorized by the TDA) generally triggers a
78
violation of the most-favored-nation (“MFN”) clause, the elimination
79
of the quantitative restrictions clause, and the non-discriminatory
80
administration of the quantitative restrictions clause.
The
responding Member may choose to not defend the measure as GATT
consistent but instead to justify it under Article XX—the Exceptions
81
Clause. The Exceptions Clause allows Members to deviate from the
82
GATT when protecting legitimate social or political objectives. In
such a situation, the responding Member has the burden of proving
83
compliance with Article XX.

under Article XX(b) might induce WTO Members to more explicitly link trade and
labor. So far, the WTO has only decided to collaborate with the ILO. No working
party, committee, or GATT/WTO treaty provision formally integrates or provides an
enforcement mechanism for labor rights. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying
text (outlining the limited union between the ILO and WTO following the 1996
Singapore Declaration).
76. See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying text (describing different violations
of the GATT that an import ban would trigger).
77. See GATT, supra note 6, art. XXIII (requiring that complaining parties suffer
from actual or potential injury).
78. See id. art. I (requiring that parties grant any trade preference on any product
to all GATT contracting parties). For example, the United States might ban imports
of hand-made bricks from Pakistan while accepting imported bricks from other WTO
Members. Pakistan would claim a violation of Article I because the United States is
granting a trade preference (the opportunity to import bricks) to all Members
except Pakistan. See id. (prohibiting this type of inequity among WTO Members).
79. See id. art. XI (requiring that parties only place duties, taxes, or charges on
imports and generally refrain from implementing prohibitions, quotas, or other
quantitative restrictions). For example, Pakistan would claim a violation of Article XI
because the United States has implemented an import prohibition on hand-made
bricks rather than any kind of tariff or charge.
80. See id. art. XIII (requiring quantitative restrictions, when allowable, to be
applied in a non-discriminatory manner). If the United States could justify a
prohibition, Pakistan might still claim an Article XIII violation because the United
States does not apply the prohibition to other brick-importing Members.
81. See id. art. XX (permitting Members to violate their commitments under the
GATT in limited instances).
82. See Salman Bal, International Free Trade Agreements and Human Rights:
Reinterpreting Article XX of the GATT, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 62, 69 (2001)
(discussing how the Exceptions Clause may permit governments to apply otherwise
illegal measures).
83. See WTO Appellate Body Report on United States—Standards for
Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R at 22 (Apr. 12, 1996)
[hereinafter Reformulated Gasoline] (noting that the party who invokes the
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84

Prior to the WTO Agreement, GATT Panels relied heavily on the
85
This
GATT drafting history when deciding Article XX claims.
reliance is not surprising. GATT Panel decisions formerly required
consensus adoption by each GATT party, including the responding
86
party. Panels may have depended on drafting history in the hopes
that the responding party would find such logic more persuasive and
87
thus vote to adopt the Panel report.
The Uruguay Round Agreements precipitated a fundamental
88
change in the dispute settlement process.
According to Dispute
Settlement Understanding (“DSU”) Article 3(2), WTO adjudicatory
bodies should rely on the “customary rules of interpretation of

exception also bears the burden of establishing that its use does not constitute an
abuse of the exception), available at http://docsonline.wto.org (last visited Feb. 14,
2002); see also Note by the Secretariat, Revision, World Trade Organization,
Committee on Trade and Environment, GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement Practice Relating
to Article XX, Paragraphs (b), (d) and (g) of GATT, WT/CTE/W/53/Rev.1, paras. 8-9
(Oct. 26, 1998) [hereinafter DSB Practice] (elaborating on burden of proof
requirements in Article XX cases), available at http://docsonline.wto.org (last visited
Feb. 14, 2002).
84. See GATT, supra note 6, art. XXIII (providing generally for resolution of
disputes but omitting any language regarding appropriate procedures).
85. See GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States—Restrictions on Imports of
Tuna, Sept. 3, 1991, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.), para. 5.25 (1991) [hereinafter
Tuna-Dolphin I] (noting that the text does not clearly answer the question at issue
and that the drafting history, purpose of the provision, and consequences for the
General Agreement as a whole must be analyzed); see also Thai Cigarettes, supra note
3, paras. 73-74 (noting that prior GATT panels have confirmed that contracting
parties intended to allow valid human health policies at the expense of trade
liberalization). But see GATT Panel Report on United States—Restrictions on
Imports of Tuna, June 16, 1994, GATT B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.), para. 5.20 (1994)
[hereinafter Tuna-Dolphin II] (proposing that the GATT Panel use international
treaties as supplementary interpretive tools under the Vienna Convention). The
Tuna-Dolphin II GATT Panel dismissed an interpretation regarding the location of
the targeted plants or animals that had been suggested in a number of international
environmental treaties. See id. para. 5.19 (finding that bilateral and plurilateral
environmental agreements are “not relevant” to Vienna Convention analysis
regarding any “subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the
interpretation of” GATT Article XX). The Panel could identify no direct references
to these treaties in the GATT drafting history. See id. para. 5.20 (concluding that
environmental agreements signed after consummation of GATT are “of little
assistance” as preparatory work to Vienna Convention analysis under GATT Article
XX).
86. See GATT, supra note 6, art. XXIII (establishing positive consensus voting in
the GATT regarding adoption of Panel decisions). The WTO Agreement changed
the process for adopting dispute settlement reports by implementing Appellate Body
and Panel reports unless the Members decide unanimously against adoption. See
DSU, supra note 37, art. 17(14) (giving Members thirty days to oppose report).
87. See Christoph T. Feddersen, Focusing on Substantive Law in International
Relations: The Public Morals of GATT’s Article XX(a) and “Conventional” Rules of
Interpretation, 7 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 75, 87-88 (1998) (suggesting that GATT Panel
reports relied on assumption that drafting history signified a “nearly authoritative
and widely accepted interpretative guide”).
88. See generally DSU, supra note 37, arts. 3, 17 (adding appellate review, adoption
by negative consensus, and international law perspective on interpretation).
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89

international law.” In practice, the WTOAB interprets this article to
mean that interpretive conflicts should be resolved by applying the
90
Vienna Convention. Under VCLT Article 31, the text’s “ordinary
91
meaning” determines its proper reading. The context, object, and
purpose of the particular treaty provision, in addition to the treaty as
92
a whole, should guide the interpretive process. Under VCLT Article
31(3)(b), subsequent interpretations of a specific treaty provision
93
also contribute to the examination of its context. In other words,
previous interpretations should influence the future interpretation of
94
the same provision. Lastly, preparatory work (and drafting history)
95
only supplement ordinary meaning analysis.
The implication of the new DSU procedures confounded WTO
96
Subsequent
Panels convened shortly after the Uruguay Round.
WTO Panels have moved away from a contract-based approach to

89. Id. art. 3(2).
90. See Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 83, at 17 (deciding that the Vienna
Convention represents the “customary rules of interpretation of international law”
mandated by DSU Article 3 because it has been relied upon by all Members); Vienna
Convention, supra note 45.
91. See Vienna Convention, supra note 45, art. 31(1) (“A treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the
terms of the treaty.”).
92. See id. (noting that the terms of the treaty should be considered “in their
context and in the light of [the treaty’s] object and purpose”); see also Blackett, supra
note 57, at 68 (contending that recent Appellate Body decisions broaden Article XX
analysis by giving a “more permissive understanding to the role of the particular
provisions within the text of the entire treaty”).
93. See Vienna Convention, supra note 45, art. 31(3)(b) (“3. There shall be taken
into account, together with the context: . . . (b) any subsequent practice in the
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
interpretation.”).
94. See WTO Appellate Body Report on Japan—Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages,
WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R, at 14 (Nov. 1, 1996)
[hereinafter Japan Alcoholic Beverages] (noting that the adopted panel reports “are
often considered by subsequent panels. They create legitimate expectations among
WTO Members, and, therefore, should be taken into account where they are
relevant to any dispute.”), available at http://docsonline.wto.org (last visited Feb. 14,
2002).
95. See Vienna Convention, supra note 45, art. 32 (“Recourse may be had to
supplementary means of interpretation, including preparatory work of the treaty . . .
to confirm the meaning . . . or to determine the meaning when the
interpretation . . . (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a
result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”).
96. See Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 83, at 11 (observing that the Panel
failed to adequately take into account the actual words used in Article XX but
instead relied too heavily on drafting history); see also WTO Appellate Body Report
on United States—Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products,
WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998), para. 115, available at http://docsonline.wto.org
(last visited Feb. 14, 2002) [hereinafter AB Shrimp-Turtle I] (commenting that the
Panel did not expressly examine the ordinary meaning or context of Article XX and
disregarded the essential sequence of steps for analyzing Article XX). For a
discussion of the WTO dispute settlement procedure as a whole, see discussion supra
note 37.
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As a result,
interpretation and towards a treaty-based approach.
drafting history plays a subordinate and complementary, rather than
98
a predominant, role. WTO Panels employ a dynamic construction
of the GATT based on ordinary meaning and context rather than
99
using a static textual construction based on drafting history. It is
100
natural that “ordinary meaning” leads to a dynamic interpretation.
Ordinary meaning analysis simply implies that adjudicators use the
understanding of individual words and phrases that has evolved over
101
time.
This shift towards a dynamic understanding of the GATT text has
102
altered the interpretation of Article XX in particular. For instance,
in the WTOAB decision in U.S.—Import Prohibition of Certain
Shrimp and Shrimp Products (“Shrimp-Turtle I”), the WTOAB
disagreed vehemently with the obsolete Panel procedure for
103
evaluating the Exceptions Clause.
The WTO Panel decided that

97. See AB Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 96, para. 130 (drawing support for its
evolutionary definition of “exhaustible natural resources” from other “modern
international conventions and declarations”); see also Blackett, supra note 57, at 70
(noting that the contractarian response to negotiating history differs fundamentally
from the appropriate use of negotiating history under the Vienna Convention).
98. See AB Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 96, para. 157 (using drafting history to
confirm its previous interpretation but not to guide its present interpretation); see
also Blackett, supra note 57, at 70-71 (illustrating how the first Shrimp-Turtle
Appellate Body looked to negotiating history but did so to confirm a prior
interpretation rather than to develop one).
99. See Feddersen, supra note 87, at 87-88 (explaining that the switch from a
positive consensus arrangement in the GATT to a negative consensus in the WTO
diminishes the prospective role of drafting history); see also AB Shrimp-Turtle I, supra
note 96, para. 129 (defining “exhaustible natural resources” in light of the
contemporary and internationally-recognized definition). See generally infra notes
141-42 and accompanying text.
100. See AB Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 96, para. 129 (submitting that the
“sustainable development” language of the WTO Preamble, incorporated through
Vienna Convention contextual analysis, requires that the generic term “natural
resources” of Article XX(g) is “by definition, evolutionary”); see also Feddersen, supra
note 87, at 108 (espousing the view that the WTO interpretive guidelines “necessitate
more flexibility and dynamic interpretation” than the GATT and that two
enumerated provisions of Article XX could conceivably overlap). See generally
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1097 (6th ed. 1990) (defining “ordinary” as “common” or
“customary”).
101. See AB Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 96, para. 129 (holding that meanings of
specific Article XX exceptions should evolve as international law and policy
develops); see also Robert Howse, The World Trade Organization and the Protection of
Workers’ Rights, 3 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 131, 142 (1999) (asserting that the
notion of accounting for international law norms in treaty interpretation already
exists within WTO dispute settlement).
102. Compare AB Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 96, para. 186 (justifying, under
Article XX(g), an unilateral and extraterritorial environmental measure aimed at
protecting sea turtles), with Tuna-Dolphin I, supra note 85, para. 5.27 (disallowing,
under Article XX(g), an unilateral and extraterritorial environmental measures
aimed at protecting dolphins).
103. See AB Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 96, paras. 117-19 (rejecting the Panel
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the measure violated the object and purpose of the WTO Agreement
as a whole, rather than the object and purpose of Article XX
104
The Panel’s analysis is antiquated and illogically
specifically.
equates current Members’ expectations regarding the purpose of
105
Article XX with those of the original GATT drafters.
In contrast, the WTOAB in Shrimp-Turtle I projected a more
106
evolutionary purpose onto the Exceptions Clause, and Members
gained the right to enact GATT-inconsistent laws for legitimate
107
public policy purposes.
The WTOAB reasoned that maintaining
the multilateral system is a “fundamental and pervasive premise
108
underlying the WTO Agreement” but “not a right or an obligation.”
The WTOAB proceeded to reaffirm the Article XX test used in
U.S.—Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline
109
(“Reformulated Gasoline”).
Under the Reformulated Gasoline test, trade-distorting policies
110
First, the
must conform to a two-step analysis under Article XX.
measure’s design and objective must fall properly under one of the
111
enumerated Article XX exceptions, denoted (a) to (j).
If a
measure is justifiable under the provisions, the second step is to test
112
its application. As applied, the measure must not be discriminatory

decision to first investigate the measure’s compliance with the Article XX chapeau
and concluding that the appropriate test should be the one enunciated in
Reformulated Gasoline); see also Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 83, para. 22
(submitting that a measure must first be provisionally justified under a specific
Article XX exception and then analyzed under the chapeau of Article XX).
104. See AB Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 96, para. 116 (“[The] Panel did not look
into the object and purpose of the chapeau of Article XX. Rather, the Panel looked
into the object and purpose of the whole of the GATT 1994 and the WTO
Agreement, which object and purpose it described in an overly broad manner.”).
105. See id. para. 121 (denouncing the Panel interpretation because it effectively
eradicated the potential use of unilateral measures). Regarding the chapeau of
Article XX, the Appellate Body appropriately focused not on the design of the
measure (i.e. unilateral, cooperative) but instead on its application. See id. para. 115
(chastising the lower Panel for “disregarding” the readily apparent purpose of Article
XX chapeau: examining the manner in which the measure is applied).
106. Id.
107. Id. (noting that paragraphs (a) through (j) of Article XX are recognized
exceptions to substantive GATT obligations, and that these exceptions reflect
domestic policies that are viewed “as important and legitimate in character”).
108. Id. para. 116.
109. Id. para. 118.
110. See Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 83, at 14 (evaluating the measure at
issue under Article XX(g) before analyzing the measure according to the provisions
of the Article XX chapeau).
111. See id. at 12 (requiring that the design of the measure at issue be “primarily
aimed at” conservation of natural resources).
112. See id. at 15-16 (requiring that the application of the measure not constitute
arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination, or a disguised restriction on international
trade).
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113

According to the WTOAB in
under the Article XX chapeau.
Shrimp-Turtle I, this analysis reflects “not inadvertence or random
choice, but rather the fundamental structure and logic of Article
114
XX.”
Applying the first step to an Article XX(b) exception, the
115
challenged policy must comport with the ordinary meaning of a
116
necessary measure enacted to protect human health. To do so, the
117
regulation must seek to guard against a valid health risk, and also,
118
the regulation must be a necessary departure from the GATT. The
definition of human health risks according to the ordinary meaning
of exception XX(b) is broadening as the WTOAB incorporates the
internationally-accepted, and similarly broadening, definitions of
119
human health risks.
In comparison, the definition of a “necessary” but trade-restrictive
120
policy has undergone a less explicit change. The necessity test has
always focused on the necessity of the measure’s design, not its policy
121
A measure does not satisfy the “necessary” clause if the
objective.
Member could employ a reasonable alternative measure more
consistent (or less inconsistent) with the GATT to achieve its
122
objective.

113. Id.
114. AB Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 96, para. 119.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 97-99 (explaining the definition of
ordinary meaning).
116. See EU Asbestos, supra note 4, para. 115 (noting that adoption of healthprotective measures under Article XX(b) is allowable despite being in conflict with
other GATT provisions).
117. See id. para. 157 (establishing that a banned product must pose a sufficient
human health risk to fall under Article XX(b)).
118. See GATT, supra note 6, art. XX(b) (stating that the measure must be
“necessary to protect human . . . life or health”).
119. See EU Asbestos, supra note 4, para. 162 (suggesting that opinions of
international bodies with expertise in defining such risks should be accorded great
weight). This approach concedes implicitly that the definition of health risks
according to the GATT drafters may be immaterial to contemporary society. See id.
(acknowledging that international bodies have agreed on the carcinogenic and
harmful nature of asbestos since 1977, three decades after the signing of the GATT
in 1947).
120. See id. paras. 170-72 (clarifying but still relying on the definition of “necessary
measure” developed in the Thailand Cigarettes case, before adoption of the DSU).
121. See Thailand Cigarettes, supra note 3, paras. 73-75 (citing prior GATT
practice that a “necessary” measure is one that is, by design, inconsistent with GATT
but to the least extent reasonably possible). See generally DSB Practice, supra note 83,
paras. 40-41 (determining that every GATT Panel performing an Article XX
“necessary” analysis has referred to the trade measure requiring justification, not the
policy objective chosen).
122. See Thailand Cigarettes, supra note 3, para. 75 (justifying Thailand’s objective
of protecting the public from health risks associated with cigarettes but objecting to
the ban on foreign cigarettes without a restriction on domestic trade).
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According to the 1994 GATT Panel in U.S.—Restrictions on
Imports of Tuna (“Tuna-Dolphin II”), unilateral sanctions applied
123
However, the Tuna-Dolphin
extraterritorially are not “necessary.”
124
In 2001,
Panels appear outdated in light of subsequent practice.
the WTOAB in European Communities—Measures Affecting
Asbestos and Asbestos—Containing Products (“Asbestos”), critically
revised the previous “necessity” test by balancing the necessity of the
125
measure against the significance of the public health objective.
Applying the second step, the challenged measure must comport
126
with the chapeau of Article XX. To do so, the measure must not be
applied in a way that arbitrarily or unjustifiably discriminates or
127
constitutes disguised protectionism.
When looking for “disguised”
128
restrictions, GATT Panels focused on the publicity of the measure.
Current WTO Panels find a violation when measures violate the
chapeau’s purpose and object of “avoiding abuse or illegitimate use
129
of the exceptions to substantive rules available in Article XX.”
WTO Panels locate an equilibrium line between a Member’s right to
invoke Article XX and another Member’s substantive rights under

123. See Tuna-Dolphin II, supra note 85, para. 5.26 (indicating that the GATT
drafters intended Article XX(b) to apply to the use of sanitary measures within the
jurisdiction of the importing country).
124. See discussion infra Parts III.B.1, III.B.2 (discussing the current use of a
balancing approach to evaluate restrictions, which allows for unilateral sanctions,
and focusing on modern practice, which authorizes the limited use of unilateral
extraterritorial measures).
125. See infra notes 199-204 and accompanying text (detailing how the adoption of
the balancing approach allowed for the French ban on asbestos).
126. See supra note 103 and accompanying text (mentioning the proper method
for evaluating a measure under the chapeau of Article XX).
127. See GATT, supra note 6, art. XX (reciting that so long as measures are not
“applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
discrimination between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised
restriction on international trade,” nothing in the GATT should prevent adoption of
measures to protect public health); see also AB Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 96, para.
120 (stating that Article XX chapeau standards for discrimination or protectionism
may differ depending on the policy objective being protected).
128. See GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States-Prohibition of Imports of
Tuna and Tuna Products from Canada, Feb. 22, 1982, GATT B.I.S.D. (29th Supp.),
para. 4.8 (1982) (deciding that the United States action should not be considered a
disguised restriction on trade because it had been taken as a trade measure and
announced publicly); see also GATT Dispute Panel Report on United States–Import
of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies, May 26, 1983, GATT B.I.S.D. (30th Supp.),
para. 56 (1983) (finding no disguised restriction because the United States published
the exclusion order at issue in the Federal Register and enforced it openly). See
generally DSB Practice, supra note 83, para. 21 & nn.26-27 (characterizing
interpretations of the GATT Panels in the Tuna Products and Spring Assemblies
cases as “very literal”).
129. Reformulated Gasoline, supra note 83, at 25. See generally DSB Practice, supra
note 83, para. 22 (emphasizing that the Appellate Body did not define the concepts
of “arbitrary discrimination” or “justifiable discrimination” but looked solely at the
Article XX chapeau’s general object and purpose).
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130

the GATT.
After the Shrimp-Turtle and Asbestos decisions, WTO dispute
settlement bodies will likely allow import prohibitions that seek to
131
protect internationally recognized policy objectives.
Thus, in
accordance with the Shrimp-Turtle decision, the key to compliance is
132
meeting the requirements of the Article XX chapeau.
In the case
of unilateral and coercive sanctions, the application of the disputed
133
measure must be non-discriminatory, transparent, and effective.
But, in any Article XX(b) case, the Member claiming the exception
must first prove that the design of its law meets its health-related
134
aim.
III. STEP ONE: THE TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT ACT’S COMPLIANCE
WITH ARTICLE XX(b)
To comply with the Article XX(b) exception, child labor must be a
valid public health concern, and the TDA must be the least trade135
The Vienna
restrictive measure to remedy that concern.
Convention and subsequent WTO dispute settlement practices form
136
an evolving interpretive framework
that will likely confer
137
provisional justification on the TDA.

130. See AB Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 96, para. 164 (holding that the use of an
economic embargo by the responding Member to coerce the complaining Member
into adopting the same domestic policy will be unjustifiable discrimination when the
responding Member fails to consider different conditions that exist in the
complaining Member’s territory).
131. See AB Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 96, para. 186 (approving use of a traderestrictive measure that serves an environmental objective and is applied in a nondiscriminatory manner); EU Asbestos, supra note 4, para. 172 (approving use of a
trade-restrictive measure that serves a human health objective and is applied in a
non-discriminatory manner).
132. See infra note 213 and accompanying text (hypothesizing that the WTOAB
now recognizes that the Article XX chapeau alone adequately protects complaining
Members from unilateral and coercive sanctions).
133. See WTO Appellate Body Report on United States–Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by
Malaysia, WT/DS58/AB/RW, para. 153 (Oct. 22, 2001) [hereinafter AB ShrimpTurtle II] (affirming a unilateral and coercive sanction after the United States
amended the measure to provide for transparency and due process), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org (last visited Apr. 11, 2002).
134. See discussion infra Part III (explaining that for the TDA to fall under the
Article XX(b) exception, child labor must be a legitimate health concern and the
restriction contained in the TDA must be essential to achieving the stated objective).
135. See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text (defining the term “necessary”
in the context of trade restrictions).
136. See supra note 131 and accompanying text (providing examples of acceptable
trade restrictions and concluding that a trend in allowing import prohibitions is
likely).
137. See infra notes 291-93 and accompanying text (discussing the TDA in the
context of Article XX(b) and resolving that, given its proper objective and
manifestation, the Act should be acceptable under the GATT framework).
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A. Preventing Child Labor is a Valid “Human Health” Objective
Under current WTO interpretation, child labor is certainly a widely
known health risk. The international community has formally
138
In
acknowledged the health problems of working children.
addition, a WTO Panel may now be more willing to recognize,
implicitly or explicitly, the purpose of “raising standards of living”
139
under the Vienna Convention’s contextual analysis.
The
definitions of “measures to protect human health” and “exhaustible
natural resources” are much broader than the narrow understanding
140
the GATT contracting parties held in 1947.
1.

Definition of public health objectives is evolving
The WTOAB in Shrimp-Turtle I confirmed that ordinary meaning
analysis is a dynamic approach to defining the legitimate policy
141
exceptions of Article XX.
In that case, the WTOAB stated that
“[t]he words of Article XX(g) ‘exhaustible natural resources,’ were
actually crafted more than fifty years ago. They must be read by a
treaty interpreter in the light of contemporary concerns of the
142
community of nations.”
The WTOAB affirmed this evolutionary definition in Asbestos.
The lower WTO Panel consulted a variety of authorities on the
143
legitimacy of the alleged health risk. The Panel considered expert
evidence, scientific documentation, international treaties, and the
144
rulings of intergovernmental organizations.
Because the sources
collectively condemned any use of asbestos, the WTOAB permitted
France to implement its “chosen level of health protection”—a
145
complete ban on importation.
The WTOAB did not base its
decision on the expectations of the original GATT contracting
146
From this decision, it seems that a WTO Panel will more
parties.

138. See discussion infra Part III.A.2 (demonstrating international consensus
concerning the existence of health risks related to child labor).
139. See discussion infra Part III.A.3 (suggesting that the WTO Preamble clause
concerning “raising standards of living” implies that social objectives should provide
context when interpreting the WTO agreements).
140. See discussion infra Part III.A.1 (defining public health objectives).
141. See supra notes 99-107 and accompanying text (explaining the ordinary
meaning analysis).
142. AB Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 96, para. 129.
143. EU Asbestos, supra note 4, paras. 159-62.
144. See id. para. 162 (noting variety and near unanimity of scientific sources
employed by the Panel and that the Panel stayed “well within the bounds of its
discretion”).
145. See id. para. 174 (doubting the efficacy of a “controlled usage” alternative to a
ban on asbestos and legitimating the French decision to totally halt the spread of
asbestos-related health risks).
146. See supra note 105 and accompanying text (recounting the Shrimp-Turtle I
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closely examine the contemporary public health concerns of the
147
WTO community when resolving disputes.
2.

The international community agrees on the health risks of child labor
A variety of international authorities specializing in health and
labor issues characterize child labor as a serious public health
problem. The WHO places children in the group of workers
148
“particularly vulnerable to occupational hazards.”
The risk to
children is heightened because they operate in the informal sector
where workers are less easily protected by public health programs and
149
more often “subjected to highly unsafe conditions.” A WHO study
found that injury is the leading cause of death among children at
work and that “one in every five or ten children sustains an accident
150
each year.”
Children do not identify occupational risks as well as
adults; thus, they are much more susceptible to workplace
151
accidents. Another international organization, the United Nations
Children’s Fund (“UNICEF”), estimated that in 1991, eighty million
children between the ages of ten and fourteen years undertook work
152
harmful to their development.
More readily than adults, working
children suffer injuries from exposure to chemicals, heavy lifting,
153
psychological abuse, and disease.
As noted above, the ILO has concluded that even non-hazardous
154
child labor damages a child’s health and development severely.
Children who work in the agricultural or service sectors rather than

Panel’s improperly restrictive interpretation of Article XX(g)).
147. See supra note 131 and accompanying text (citing the WTOAB’s approval of
policy objectives as defined by international organizations in both Shrimp-Turtle
cases).
148. Fourth Network Meeting of the WHO Collaborating Centres in Occupational
Health, Espoo, Finland, Summary Report, WHO Protection of the Human
Environment: Occupational and Environmental Health Series, at 31 (June 9, 1999).
149. Id.; see also Valentina Forastieri, Challenges in Combatting Child Labour From an
Occupational Health Perspective, 7 ILO/FINNIDA Asian-Pacific Regional Programme
on Occupational Safety and Health 2 (2000) (citing ILO survey of twenty-six nations
that found that working children are mainly in rural and informal sectors), at
http://www.occuphealth.fi/e/info/asian/ap200/challenges 02.htm (last visited Feb.
14, 2002).
150. See VALENTINA FORASTIERI, CHILDREN AT WORK: HEALTH AND SAFETY RISKS 19
(International Labour Office, 1997) (describing the dangers inherent in child
labor).
151. Id.
152. Christiaan Grootaert & Harry Anthony Patrinos, The Policy Analysis of Child
Labor, in THE POLICY ANALYSIS OF CHILD LABOR: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 1 (Christiaan
Grootaert & Harry Anthony Patrinos eds., 1999).
153. A. BEQUELE & W.E. MYERS, FIRST THINGS FIRST IN CHILD LABOUR: ELIMINATING
WORK DETRIMENTAL TO CHILDREN, 6 (International Labour Office, 1995).
154. See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text (summarizing ILO studies and
findings).
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155

attending school consistently grow up to be shorter in stature,
156
157
lighter in weight, and inferior in overall health.
The conditions
under which some child labor is carried out—intense heat or cold,
long hours, dust and fumes—damage the child’s health even when
158
the work is not intrinsically dangerous.
Considering that an
estimated 250 million children between the ages of five and fourteen
years work regularly, half of them on a full-time basis, the health
159
problems are truly widespread.
For all of these reasons, in 1983,
the ILO Director-General included “work that places too heavy a
burden on the child” and “work that endangers his safety, health or
160
welfare” in the definition of “child labor.”
3.

The WTO Preamble’s goal of “raising standards of living” should be
integrated
In evaluating the ordinary meaning of protecting human health, a
reasonable WTO Panel might determine that the WTO Preamble
161
legitimizes limited social objectives, such as eradicating child labor.
The Preamble mandates that trade “be conducted with a view to
162
raising standards of living.”
In Shrimp-Turtle I, the WTOAB
approved the environmental policy objective at issue partly by
referencing the “sustainable development” language of the WTO
163
Preamble.
This perambular language indicates both the intent of
GATT and WTO negotiators and adds “colour, texture and shading”

155. Report VI(1) Child Labour: Targeting the Intolerable, International Labour
Conference, 86th Sess., Agenda Item 6, at 8 (1998) (citing CHILDREN AT WORK:
SPECIAL HEALTH RISKS, WHO, Technical Report Series No. 756 (1987)).
156. Id.
157. See id. (stating that “the health of children working in hotels, restaurants,
construction and elsewhere was found to be considerably inferior to that of a control
group of children attending school.”) (citing U. Naidu & S. Parasuman, Health
Situation of Working Children in Greater Bombay, Unit for Child and Youth Research,
Tata Institute of Social Sciences (1985)).
158. See ACTION AGAINST CHILD LABOUR 13 (Nielien Haspels & Michele Jankanish
eds., 2000) (reviewing developmental implications on children of non-hazardous
labor); see also Jennifer Bol, Using International Law to Fight Child Labor: A Case Study of
Guatemala and the Inter-American System, 13 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1135, 1146 (1998)
(citing evidence that the development and education of children suffer when they try
to combine work with school because work is often fatiguing or inordinately timeconsuming).
159. See Ashagrie, Working Children Statistics, supra note 13, at 2 (discussing the
range of statistics demonstrating the pervasiveness of child labor).
160. Bol, supra note 158, at 1141-42 (1998).
161. See Geneva Barshefsky Statement, supra note 71 (suggesting that the WTO’s
overarching goal of “raising standards of living” refers to the promotion of labor
standards).
162. WTO Agreement, supra note 2, pmbl.
163. See AB Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 96, paras. 152-53 (recognizing that the
perambular language on “sustainable development” should be read in conjunction
with a specific Article XX provision).
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164

to the interpretation of Article XX. Because health factors into any
standard of living assessment, improving health by eradicating child
165
labor would raise living standards.
However, in Shrimp-Turtle I, the WTOAB pointed to additional
evidence that Members had explicitly agreed to protect the
environment. The WTOAB noted that the Members established a
166
Committee on Trade and Environment (“CTE”). It might also have
been relevant that the Members decided, in the Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade (“TBT”), to permit technical measures
167
that protect the environment.
Directly analogous evidence of
168
formal agreement by Members on labor issues is lacking.
Nonetheless, the Singapore Declaration did explicitly define the
169
WTO position on the trade-labor relationship for the first time.
Thus, Members recognized that trade affects labor rights and that a
170
policy decision would therefore be necessary.
By formalizing
decisions on the environment (CTE and TBT) and labor (Singapore
Declaration), in both instances the WTO arguably found that a trade
164. Id. para. 153.
165. See, e.g., The Analysis of Household Surveys: A Microeconomic Approach to
Development Policy, Living Standards Measurement Study of the World Bank
(reporting that World Bank studies of living standards include measurements of data
such as nutrition, expenditure patterns, educational attainment, earnings, and
health) (citing ANGUS DEATON, THE ANALYSIS OF HOUSEHOLD SURVEYS: A
MICROECONOMIC APPROACH TO DEVELOPMENT POLICY (World Bank, 1997)), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/lsms/tools/deaton/intro.htm (last visited Apr. 15,
2002); Brief History of the Living Standards Measurement Study, Living Standards
Measurement Study of the World Bank (describing how living standards surveys
eventually added objectives of measuring health indicators) (citing M. GROSH & P.
GLEWWE, A GUIDE TO LIVING STANDARDS SURVEYS AND THEIR DATA SETS (World Bank,
Working Paper No. 120, 1995)), available at http://www.worldbank.org/lsms/
guide/history.html (last updated Mar. 1, 1996); see also Pakistan Integrated
Household Survey 1991, World Bank, Poverty and Resources Division (Dec. 1995), at
1-2 (listing “Health” as a major section in the household living standards
questionnaire conducted in Pakistan), available at http://www.worldbank.org/lsms/
country/pk91/pk91.pdf (last visited Apr. 15, 2002).
166. See AB Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 96, para. 154 (determining that the CTE
signifies an indication of intent among Members to recognize environmental
objectives in the WTO).
167. See WTO Agreement, supra note 2, art. 5.4 (allowing Members to promulgate
technical regulations designed for “protection of . . . the environment”).
168. See supra notes 57-58 and accompanying text (noting that only Article XX(e)
contains a reference to “prison labour”).
169. See supra notes 66-67 and accompanying text (noting broad language of the
Singapore Declaration that the WTO should “support” the ILO but that the ILO
should “set and deal with” labor standards).
170. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text (describing language and
purpose of Singapore Declaration); see also GEORGE TSOGAS, LABOR REGULATION IN A
GLOBAL ECONOMY 45 (M.E. Sharpe, Inc. ed., 2001) (asserting that the Singapore
Declaration does not close the door to a trade-labor link, but rather shows some
acceptance of labor standards by developing country WTO Members, even if the
Declaration is not very explicit).
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related objective sufficiently touches and concerns the purpose of the
171
WTO as set forth in the Preamble.
Two possible conclusions can be drawn from the use of the
Preamble in Shrimp-Turtle I. A limited conclusion is that only those
clauses added to or removed from the GATT Preamble to form the
WTO Preamble—such as “sustainable development”—demonstrate
172
consensus among Members.
A broader conclusion is that a
contextual analysis should incorporate the entire WTO Preamble,
including former GATT Preamble clauses, such as “standards of
173
living.”
The latter reasoning follows the modern and dynamic
174
interpretative approach more closely. If ordinary meaning analysis
incorporates the Preamble, a WTO Panel must account for the goal
of “raising standards of living” when defining a measure protecting
175
“human life,” such as the TSA.
In summary, the recognition of the health risk inherent in child
176
labor is not confined to researchers and policymakers in Geneva.
The community of nations accepts the hazardous character of child
labor, as evidenced by widespread ratification of the two major
177
relevant treaties: ILO Convention 182 (“ILO 182”) and the United
Nations (“UN”) Convention on the Rights of the Child (“UN
178
Convention”).
The ordinary meaning of a measure to protect
human health must include the TDA, a law to prevent child labor
179
and its associated health concerns.

171. Cf. Hudec, supra note 51, at 143 (implying that the WTOAB could
incorporate the “raising the standards of living” language in the same way as the
“sustainable development” language).
172. Cf. AB Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 96, paras. 152-53 (implying, possibly, that
only the deleted words “full use of the resources of the world” and added words
“optimal use of the world’s resources in accordance with sustainable development” of
the WTO Preamble reflect the intent of WTO negotiators).
173. See supra notes 161-71 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the
WTOAB has incorporated the “sustainable development” language of the WTO
Preamble when interpreting Article XX and arguing that the “raising standards of
living” language should be similarly incorporated).
174. See supra notes 102-08 and accompanying text (outlining the interpretive shift
towards a more contemporary reading of the WTO text).
175. Supra note 173.
176. See supra notes 12, 41 and accompanying text (demonstrating additional
consensus among scholars, public, and numerous governments that have ratified
major international child labor treaties).
177. See supra notes 13, 41 (citing language and signatories of ILO 182).
178. See supra notes 13, 41 (citing language and signatories of UN Convention).
179. See 146 CONG. REC. S3,864-65 (2000) (statement of Sen. Harkin) (declaring
that the TDA provision regarding child labor is an attempt to build on commitments
of the ILO 182 signatories). Senator Harkin added that his amendment to the bill,
elaborating the child labor product ban, passed the Senate by a resounding vote. See
id. at 3864 (citing the 96-0 Senate vote).
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B. The Trade and Development Act is Necessary
to Accomplish its Policy Objective
The import prohibition permitted by the TDA is necessary to
achieve the eradication of child labor. After legitimating a measure’s
policy goal, WTO Panels evaluate whether deviating from the
180
GATT/WTO framework is indeed necessary to achieve the goal. In
essence, the Panel examines whether policymakers ignored equally
effective alternatives that would have been more consistent with the
181
GATT, and thus less restrictive on trade.
This prong of the
182
provisional justification test generates considerable controversy.
183
The Tuna-Dolphin disputes, which were never adopted, remain
the only instances in which GATT Panels have evaluated unilateral
sanctions applied by one party to protect the health of living
organisms within another party’s territory, pursuant to Article
184
XX(b). In both Tuna-Dolphin cases, the GATT Panels found that
the United States Marine Mammal Protection Act (“MMPA”)
185
deviated unnecessarily from the GATT.
The MMPA prohibited
U.S. imports of foreign tuna caught without using dolphin-safe
186
The ban applied to countries where the unsafe tuna
techniques.
originated and to “intermediary” countries that traded in unsafe
187
tuna.

180. See EU Asbestos, supra note 4, paras. 170-72 (adding that several factors,
including the importance of health objectives and the effectiveness of the measure,
must be taken into account when performing the necessity test).
181. See id. paras. 173-75 (evaluating the efficacy of the suggested alternative to a
complete ban on asbestos—“controlled usage”).
182. See, e.g., Bal, supra note 82, at 100-01 (challenging the decision of GATT
Panels to give priority to the least trade restrictive measures over measures that more
effectively accomplish their policy objectives as turning “the clause on its head”);
Steve Charnovitz, Exploring the Environmental Exceptions in GATT Article XX, 25 J.
WORLD TRADE 37, 49 (1991) [hereinafter Charnovitz, Environmental Exceptions]
(criticizing attempts by GATT Panels to define the “least degree of inconsistency”
with the GATT and to weigh policy options); Ilona Cheyne, Environmental
Unilateralism and the WTO/GATT System, 24 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 433, 460-61 (1995)
(disagreeing with the GATT Panel decision that indirect trade measures are never
necessary regardless of the efficacy of less trade-restrictive measures or the
importance of the objective).
183. See Feddersen, supra note 87, at 117 (noting that GATT contracting parties
adopted neither Tuna-Dolphin Panel report).
184. See DSB Practice, supra note 83, para. 46 (listing the two Tuna-Dolphin cases as
the only GATT Panel reports to address extraterritoriality under Article XX(b)).
185. See Tuna-Dolphin I, supra note 85, para. 5.29 (disallowing American direct
import prohibition of Mexican tuna products); Tuna-Dolphin II, supra note 85, para.
5.39 (considering the United States embargo of dolphin-unsafe tuna from third party
nations to be unnecessary for the protection of animal life or health).
186. See Tuna-Dolphin I, supra note 85, para. 2.5 (prohibiting the import of “any
fish or fish product harvested through the incidental taking of marine mammals”).
187. See Tuna-Dolphin II, supra note 85, paras. 5.2-5.5 (detailing import
prohibition of tuna from third party countries that exported tuna caught by
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According to the Tuna-Dolphin Panels, a measure intended to
protect animal life or health could be permissible under Article
188
However, the measure could not be accomplished by
XX(b).
unilateral action or by means reaching beyond United States territory
189
The GATT Panels relied on
and into the jurisdiction of another.
190
the drafting history of Article XX(b) and the failure of the United
191
Most
States to negotiate an international cooperative agreement.
importantly, the Panels questioned the viability of the GATT system
192
in a world of unregulated trade embargoes.
As explained in Part
III(B)(1), these floodgate arguments do not apply if a measure, like
193
the TDA, is applied in a non-discriminatory fashion.
Applying the final Tuna-Dolphin II ruling, the United States would
need to justify its ban on products made by child labor in light of the
194
options “reasonably available.” The TDA authorizes the application
of unilateral sanctions to effect a policy change in another Member’s
195
jurisdiction.
Because of its design, the TDA would not be a valid
Article XX(b) exception under the outdated Tuna-Dolphin
196
“necessary” standard.

unlicensed fishermen).
188. See Tuna-Dolphin I, supra note 85, para. 5.24 (prohibiting the U.S. embargo
because all reasonably available options had not been exhausted); Tuna-Dolphin II,
supra note 85, at para. 5.38 (remarking that policies to coerce other countries into
changing laws within their jurisdictions pursuant to Article XX(b) would seriously
impair the objectives of the General Agreement).
189. See Tuna-Dolphin II, supra note 85, para. 5.38 (asserting that the use of
coercive measures must be limited to affecting a policy within the jurisdiction
enforcing the measure).
190. See Tuna-Dolphin I, supra note 85, para. 5.26 (concluding that removal from
Article XX(b) of the phrase “if corresponding safeguards under similar conditions
exist in the importing country,” which was used in the ITO Charter’s New York Draft,
evidenced an intent to exclude use of sanitary measures applied outside one party’s
jurisdiction); Tuna-Dolphin II, supra note 85, paras. 5.31, 5.42 (noting that the
drafting history’s silence on the extraterritorial application issue and concluding that
“recognized methods of interpretation” lent no support to the United States’
viewpoint).
191. See Tuna-Dolphin I, supra note 85, para. 5.28 (finding that the United States
had not negotiated satisfactorily with the complaining parties).
192. See Tuna-Dolphin I, supra note 85, para. 5.27 (postulating that the
multilateral trading framework would provide legal security only for parties with
identical internal regulations); Tuna-Dolphin II, supra note 85, para. 5.38 (resting its
decision on the potential injury to basic objectives and principles of the GATT).
193. See discussion infra Part III.B.1 (explaining how the Shrimp-Turtle decisions
negated arguments that extraterritorial trade measures would destroy the
multilateral trading system).
194. See Tuna-Dolphin II, supra note 85, para. 5.35 (accepting the ThailandCigarettes Panel approach to determining the necessity of a chosen measure).
195. See Trade and Development Act, Pub. L. No. 106-200, § 411, 114 Stat. 251
(2000) (allowing the Customs Service to ban imports made by forced or indentured
child labor).
196. See Tuna-Dolphin I, supra note 85, para. 5.28 (failing to approve a U.S.
measure as necessary for protection of animal life or health because the United
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However, there are a number of reasons why the Tuna-Dolphin
categorical rule excluding extraterritorial measures should be
abandoned. Subsequent WTO practice has relaxed the restriction on
197
coercive extraterritorial measures under Article XX and, applying a
balancing approach, permitted the use of unilateral sanctions when
198
guarding human life.
1.

Subsequent practice permitting unilateral sanctions under a balancing
approach
Ten years after the first Tuna-Dolphin GATT panel decision, the
WTOAB again addressed the “necessity” of a unilateral measure in
199
Asbestos. The WTOAB ratified the reasonable alternative approach
from Thailand—Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes
200
on Cigarettes, but added a balancing process. The “vitality” of the
policy objective and the extent to which an alternative measure
“contributes to the realization of the end” factors into this balancing
201
process. The WTOAB valued the French measure banning asbestos
202
as “important in the highest degree” and stated that such a measure
203
to protect human life would be “more easily justified.” As a result,
France could employ a prohibition on asbestos rather than an
204
unproven method such as controlled usage.
In contrast, the Tuna-Dolphin GATT Panels evaluated Article
XX(b)’s application to protecting animal life and did not relate the

States did not effectively negotiate an international agreement); Tuna-Dolphin II,
supra note 85, para. 5.39 (failing to approve a U.S. measure as necessary for the
protection of animal life or health because the measure forced other countries to
change their policies).
197. See discussion infra Part III.B.2 (establishing that the WTOAB has approved of
coercive extraterritorial measures).
198. See discussion infra Part III.B.1 (establishing that the WTOAB has approved of
unilateral measures under Article XX(b)).
199. See EU Asbestos, supra note 4, para. 170 (realizing that necessity test is
applicable and applying test to French import ban on asbestos).
200. See id. paras. 171-72 (suggesting that the WTO Panel should evaluate whether
less restrictive trade measure will adequately achieve same end as import
prohibition); see also Thai Cigarettes, supra note 3, para. 75 (requiring that Article
XX(b) measures be no more trade-restrictive than necessary).
201. EU Asbestos, supra note 4, para. 172; see also WTO Appellate Body Report,
Korea–Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef,
WT/DS169/AB/R,
paras.
163,
166
(Jan.
10,
2001),
available
at
http://docsonline.wto.org (last visited Feb. 14, 2002) [hereinafter Korea Beef]
(utilizing a balancing approach to determine whether a more GATT consistent
alternative is reasonably available).
202. EU Asbestos, supra note 4, para. 172.
203. Id.
204. See id. para. 174 (allowing the French ban on asbestos because of scientific
doubts regarding efficacy of “controlled usage”).
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Given the
measure’s necessity to the “vitality” of its objective.
Asbestos outcome, modern WTO Panels using a balancing approach
would presumably give more legitimacy to a unilateral measure
aimed at eradicating child labor, a threat to human health, than a
206
measure aimed at eradicating a threat to animal health.
Correspondingly, the responding WTO Member would be given
more latitude to choose a more efficient measure rather than blindly
207
implementing the least trade-restrictive alternative.
It is worth noting that the WTOAB, in Asbestos, ruled only on the
208
legality of a purely domestic prohibition. France did not attempt to
coerce other nations into adopting a similar domestic ban on
209
asbestos.
Nonetheless, one should not infer from the distinction
between purely domestic measures and coercive measures that a
future WTO Panel would not permit a coercive measure such as the
210
TDA.
The disputing Members in Asbestos simply did not present
211
the issue of extraterritorial health measures under Article XX(b).
Thus, the WTOAB in Asbestos neither disapproved nor approved of
212
them.
Furthermore, the Shrimp-Turtle I decision may imply that
the Article XX chapeau alone, and not the requirements of Article
XX(g) specifically, protects complaining Members from unfairly
213
coercive measures.
Thus, the same conclusion could be reached
for Article XX(b)–-that the chapeau alone provides sufficient

205. Compare Tuna-Dolphin I, supra note 85, para. 5.28 (disapproving of a measure
enacted to protect animal life or health: dolphins), and Tuna-Dolphin II, supra note
85, para. 5.39 (same), with EU Asbestos, supra note 4, para. 172 (advocating a
balancing test between the vitality of a human health objective and the GATT
consistency of the measure’s design).
206. See Julie H. Paltrowitz, A “Greening” of the World Trade Organization? A Case
Comment on the Asbestos Report, 26 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1789, 1826 (2001) (suggesting
that the Asbestos case balancing approach has introduced an element of deference
to health needs of WTO Members).
207. See id. (portraying the “sufficiently effective” standard used by WTOAB in
Asbestos as a more pragmatic and realistic interpretation of the “least restrictive
alternative” standard that considers relative difficulty of Members in implementing
various health measures).
208. See EU Asbestos, supra note 4, para. 175 (upholding decree that all asbestosrelated products could not enter France).
209. See id. (permitting a law that would forbid use of asbestos in the importing
country but would not condition entry of foreign asbestos on similar prohibition in
exporting country).
210. See supra notes 208-09 and accompanying text (discussing French asbestos
law).
211. See EU Asbestos, supra note 4, para. 175 (ruling on import prohibition that
accompanied domestic prohibition).
212. See id. (approving only import ban unrelated to laws of exporting Member).
213. See AB Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 96, para. 156 (stating that preventing
abuse and misuse of specific Article XX exceptions is purpose of Article XX
chapeau); see also discussion supra Part III.B.2.
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214

protection.
Under an assumption that the chapeau alone should evaluate
coercive measures, it may no longer be necessary for a WTO Panel to
intensely scrutinize all of the policy options reasonably available to
215
the United States other than the TDA.
This kind of policy
216
balancing draws the WTO Panel outside its range of expertise.
In
the alternative, if the WTO Panel did look into the U.S. policy
decision to eradicate child labor, the Panel would likely find that no
measure other than the TDA would meet the “sufficiently effective”
217
standard under the Asbestos test.
The United States has already
created programs that combat child labor and are more consistent
218
with the GATT.
A wide range of policy analysts and economists
agree that among GATT-consistent measures, none shows the
219
These programs generally fall into four
promise of total efficacy.
groups: (1) measures granting and revoking trade preferences;
(2) measures promoting investment in nations with acceptable child
labor records; (3) “social labeling” measures; and (4) multilateral
220
negotiations.
In the trade preferences group, the Trade Act of 1974 permits the
President to designate developing countries as participants in the
221
Generalized System of Preferences (“GSP”) program only if they

214. See infra notes 284-88 and accompanying text (asserting that the WTOAB
considers the jurisdictional element of Article XX exceptions in its chapeau analysis
only).
215. See supra notes 208-14 and accompanying text (suggesting that analysis of
reasonable and less trade-restrictive alternatives may be obsolete); see also Charnovitz,
Environmental Exceptions, supra note 182, at 49 (questioning logic of WTO Panel
weighing GATT consistency of action because both the Panel and GATT actions in
question prove inconsistent with different GATT clauses including Article XI and
XIII).
216. See supra note 182 and accompanying text (citing scholarly criticism of WTO
dispute settlement bodies that analyze and question policy choices).
217. See infra note 261 and accompanying text (concluding that the severity of the
child labor problem justifies unusually drastic measures, such as unilateral
embargoes).
218. See Lisa G. Baltazar, Government Sanctions and Private Initiatives: Striking A New
Balance For U.S. Enforcement of Internationally-Recognized Workers’ Rights, 29 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 687, 689-93 (1998) (examining a range of U.S. policies attempting
to enforce internationally-recognized labor rights, including multilateral
mechanisms, conditioned trade assistance programs, and private initiatives).
219. See id. at 721-22 (criticizing current U.S. efforts as “disappointing and subject
to blatant inconsistencies”); Lance Compa, Going Multilateral: The Evolution of U.S.
Hemispheric Labor Rights Policy Under GSP and NAFTA, 10 CONN. J. INT’L L. 337, 344-50
(1995) (examining GSP “wins” and “losses” when acting to counter labor violations).
220. See James P. Kelleher, The Child Labor Deterrence Act: American Unilateralism and
the GATT, 3 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 161, 163-70 (1994) (discussing the four main
categories of policies dealing with international labor rights).
221. GSP Renewal Act, Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573, §§ 501508, 98 Stat. 2948, 3018-24 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-706).
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demonstrate a commitment to eliminating the worst forms of child
222
223
The Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act (“CBERA”)
labor.
similarly qualifies the access of Caribbean nations to preferential
224
Like the TDA, the Omnibus Trade and
trade status.
Competitiveness Act of 1988 permits the U.S. Trade Representative to
investigate workers’ rights abuses and revoke a nation’s most-favored
225
nation trade status.
The GSP and CBERA programs conform more closely to the GATT
than an import prohibition because developing countries receive a
226
duty-free tariff rate under those programs.
There is little
227
consensus, however, on the efficacy of revoking trade preferences.
By definition, a rescission of GSP sets the affected country’s tariff
level at the bound GATT rate, the level afforded to all non-GSP
228
Members of the WTO. Because the bound GATT rate is already so
low on many products, developing nations that lose GSP status may
229
be hardly affected. GSP revocation sometimes improves child labor

222. See id. § 503(b)(6) (directing the President to refuse GSP status to countries
“not taking steps to afford internationally recognized worker rights”).
223. 19 U.S.C. § 2703 (2001).
224. See id. § 2703(b)(5)(B)(iv) (requiring beneficiary country to implement “its
commitments to eliminate the worst forms of child labor”).
225. Trade Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-618, § 121(a)(4), 88 Stat. 1986, amended by
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
§ 1101(b)(14), 102 Stat. 1107, 1125 (codified at 19 U.S.C. § 2901(b)(14) (1989)
[hereinafter OTCA]. The OTCA may have the same effects as an import prohibition
of child labor products but the OTCA is no more consistent with the GATT than the
TDA. See GATT, supra note 6, arts. I, XI (requiring that Members grant any trade
preferences to all other WTO Members and refrain from prohibiting the imports of
any Member). The denial of MFN status and the imposition of quantitative
restrictions distort trade equally. Compare Trade and Development Act, Pub. L. No.
106-200, § 411, 114 Stat. 251 (2000) (enacting labor rights-related import
prohibition), with OTCA, supra note 225, § 1101(b)(14) (suspending application of
WTO-negotiated bound tariff rates to countries that violate workers’ rights); see also
supra note 215 and accompanying text.
226. See GSP Renewal Act § 503(b)(8) (denying GSP duty-free tariff status to
countries that fail to protect workers’ rights and setting tariff levels at GATT Article
II bound rates); 19 U.S.C. § 2703(b)(5)(B)(iv) (mimicking GSP Renewal Act
provisions with respect to Caribbean nations). As a Member of the WTO, the United
States is obligated to guarantee a negotiated tariff level on all imports and to all
WTO Members. See GATT, supra note 6, arts. I, II (binding Members to individual
schedule of tariff commitments and granting most-favored nation status to all WTO
Members).
227. See supra notes 230-31 and accompanying text (citing scholarly lack of
consensus). See generally HENRY J. FRUNDT, TRADE CONDITIONS AND LABOR RIGHTS: U.S.
INITIATIVES, DOMINICAN AND CENTRAL AMERICA RESPONSES 100 (Univ. Press of Florida
1998) (separating effects of GSP revocation programs in Latin America into efforts
that facilitated passage of labor legislation and efforts that had little clear effect on
labor rights in actual practice).
228. See supra note 226 and accompanying text (discussing effect of rescinding
GSP status of WTO Member).
229. See infra note 231 and accompanying text (noting the inconsistent
effectiveness and frequent failures of the GSP program).
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231

conditions, but success is not guaranteed. In contrast, an import
232
ban like the TDA prohibits market access to child labor products,
233
rather than simply providing for more expensive access, and would
234
certainly be more influential. Thus, rescission of trade preferences
235
would be less “sufficiently effective” than the TDA.
In the investment protection group, the United States promotes
labor law enforcement through initiatives that do not violate GATT
236
The investment insurance activities of the Overseas
provisions.
237
Private Investment Corporation (“OPIC”) are limited to countries
“taking steps to adopt and implement laws that extend internationally
238
Also, the U.S. Director of the
recognized worker rights.”
239
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (“MIGA”) must oppose
by law any investment measure proposed by the World Bank if the

230. See Compa, supra note 219, at 347-49 (surmising that revocation of GSP status
contributed to democratic movements in Chile, Paraguay, and Guatemala and
facilitated rise of unions and reform of labor code in Dominican Republic);
Benjamin N. Davis, Note and Comment, The Effects of Workers Rights Protections in
United States Trade Laws: A Case Study of El Salvador, 10 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 1167,
1213-14 (1995) (concluding that GSP revocation program had positive effect on
workers’ rights in El Salvador albeit relatively minor effect).
231. See Theresa A. Amato, Labor Rights Conditionality: United States Trade Legislation
and the Int’l Trade Order, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 79, 99-100 (1990) (listing several instances
where labor rights violations in certain countries were well-known but USTR took no
action under GSP program); Bol, supra note 158, at 708-14 (complaining that
enforcement of labor rights standards with GSP program is subjective, improperly
discretionary, arbitrary, and unfair); Kelleher, supra note 220, at 165-66 (showing
how supposed contingency of GSP status on improvements in beneficiary country’s
labor standards is eroded by a variety of procedures conferring discretion upon
executive officials); Davis, supra note 230, at 1175 (contending that many
commentators consider GSP revocation process to be “highly politicized”); Garg,
supra note 12, at 500-01 (blaming “vague and discretionary” GSP procedures on fact
that United States has ignored blatant labor rights violations in developing countries
and readily granted exceptions to compliance with GSP labor rights provisions).
232. See Trade and Development Act, Pub. L. No. 106-200, § 411, 114 Stat. 251
(2000) (prohibiting importation of child labor products).
233. See GSP Renewal Act, Trade and Tariff Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-573,
§ 503(b)(8), 98 Stat. 2948, 3018-24 (codified as amended at 19 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2706)
(permitting importation of child labor products but not at duty-free rate).
234. See AB Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 96, para. 171 (remarking that import
prohibition is ordinarily “the heaviest weapon in a Member’s armoury of trade
measures”).
235. See Hudec, supra note 51, at 144 (resolving that trade sanctions or threat of
sanctions are quite successful in producing change in governmental or private
behavior).
236. See discussion infra notes 238-40 and accompanying text (describing U.S.
measures that conditionally protect foreign investment but do not generally affect
the rights of WTO Members); see also GATT, supra note 6, art. II (setting tariff rates
and allowing only departures downwards).
237. 22 U.S.C. §§ 2191-2200 (1985).
238. See id. § 2191a(a)(1) (conditioning country’s access to OPIC investment
insurance on determination regarding labor record).
239. The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) Act, 22 U.S.C.
§ 290k-2 (1989).
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beneficiary developing nation does not adequately enforce labor
240
standards. Investment-related measures alone, however, have yet to
achieve the avowed goal of the international community—
241
eliminating the worst forms of child labor. A trade measure like the
242
OPIC and
TDA would complement investment-related efforts.
MIGA alone are not “sufficiently effective” if they require an
243
additional program (e.g., the TDA) to accomplish their objectives.
In the “social labeling” group, the U.S. Government and private
actors often pursue programs that affix “child-labor free” labels on
244
compliant products.
Two congressmen proposed the Child Labor
Free Consumer Information Act of 1999 to place such labels on
245
imported products.
Labeling uses market mechanisms to alter
246
consumptive demand for the products of child labor. A number of
ILO studies question the feasibility and effectiveness of such
247
programs.
Other commentators cite problems of consumer
248
awareness and enforcement. Lastly, it is not clear whether labeling

240. See id. § 290k-3(1)(A) (authorizing United States to participate in World
Bank program but not to support beneficiary countries with deplorable labor rights
records).
241. See discussion infra Part III.A.2 (illustrating the continued prevalence of child
labor).
242. See supra notes 234-235 and accompanying text.
243. See Janelle M. Diller & David A. Levy, Note and Comment, Child Labor, Trade
and Investment: Toward the Harmonization of International Law, 91 AM. J. INT’L L. 663,
693, 696 (1997) (evaluating full range of U.S. investment measures related to child
labor eradication and concluding that it is too early to determine whether such
measures will truly discourage extreme forms of child labor).
244. See Garg, supra note 12, at 504 (examining positive and negative aspects of
programs that label products as “child-labor free” and rely on market mechanisms to
discourage trade).
245. See Child Labor Free Consumer Information Act of 1999, S. 1549, 106th
Cong. § 101(a)(1) (encouraging use of an “easily identifiable symbol or term
indicating that the article or section of wearing apparel or sporting good was not
made with child labor”).
246. See supra note 244 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of labeling
on consumer behavior).
247. See Alakh N. Sharma, et al., The Impact of Social Labelling on Child Labour in
India’s Carpet Industry, ILO/IPEC Working Paper, 78 (2000) (deducing that labeling
programs in India have “played a limited role in addressing the problem of child
labour” primarily due to divergent standards and poor monitoring), at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/ipec/publ/policy/papers/india/indi
a.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2002); Centro de Estudos em Administracao do Terceiro
Setor, Dundacao Instituto de Administracao, Universidade de Sao Paulo, Social
Labelling Against Child Labour: Brazilian Experiences, ILO/IPEC Working Paper, 95-96
(2000) (stressing problem of ineffectual monitoring of social labeling programs in
Brazil and suggesting that labeling alone cannot accomplish significant reduction in
child labor), at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/ipec/publ/policy/
papers/brazil/report.pdf (last visited Apr. 12, 2002).
248. See Garg, supra note 12, at 504-05 (arguing that low public awareness of social
labeling and widespread mislabeling of products may render social labeling program
ineffective).

MITRO.PRINTER.DOC

1256

10/2/2002 2:38 PM

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51: 1223

249

requirements conform more closely to the GATT.
In the international negotiations group, the United States has
actively sought out intergovernmental and multilateral means to
250
enforce child labor laws. In the ILO, the United States has ratified
251
the major child labor conventions and makes the largest annual
252
contributions to both the ILO General Budget and the budget of
253
the International Program to Eliminate Child Labor (“IPEC”).
IPEC provides assistance to nations that concede their inadequacy at
254
enforcing child labor laws.
The results of these cooperative
255
Furthermore, it is widely
programs remain inconclusive.
acknowledged that the ILO enforcement mechanism of
256
“moralsuasion” continues to be ineffective.
Until ILO standards are enforced multilaterally, no alternative to
the TDA seems “sufficiently effective” to deny that an import ban on
257
child labor products is “necessary” under Article XX(b).
Each

249. See
WTO
Press
Release,
Trade
and
Environment
Bulletin,
WT/PRESS/TE/036 (July 6, 2001) (noting that some Members agree that labeling
may be causing market access problems for developing countries, particularly with
respect to non-product-related production and processing methods), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org (last visited Apr. 12, 2002).
250. See supra notes 59-71 and accompanying text (recounting how the United
States has historically pursued a WTO social clause and supported international child
labor treaties and initiatives).
251. See ILO 182 Ratifications, supra note 41 (indicating that United States ratified
treaty on Dec. 2, 1999).
252. Programme and Budget Proposals and Other Financial Questions, Int’l Labour
Conf., ILO, 89th Sess., Agenda Item 2, app. VI (2001), at http://www.ilo.org/public/
english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc89/pdf/pr-11.pdf [hereinafter ILO Budget 2002]
(last visited Apr. 12, 2002).
253. Programme and Budget: Proposals for 2000-01, Infocus Programme on Child Labour:
IPEC (Nov. 1999) [hereinafter IPEC Budget 2002], at http://www.ilo.org/public/
english/standards/ipec/publ/pb99/table6.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2002).
254. See Report I(B) of the Director-General: Stopping Forced Labour, Global Report under
the Follow-up to the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, Int’l
Labour Conf., 89th Sess., at 40 (2001) (illustrating joint European Union/ILO
technical cooperation agreement providing for projects to raise awareness of bonded
labor, increase capacity of children to withdraw from such work, and rehabilitate
child laborers).
255. See id. at 40-41 (exhibiting concern that bonded labor has not decreased in
magnitude or intensity and has shifted to new industries).
256. See Drusilla K. Brown, A Transactions Cost Politics Analysis of International Child
Labor Standards, in ALAN V. DEARDORFF & ROBERT M. STERN, SOCIAL DIMENSIONS OF
U.S. TRADE POLICY 259 (Alan Deardorff & Robert M. Stern eds., 2000) (describing
ILO as having “a very small range of tasks and virtually no power of enforcement”);
Baltazar, supra note 218, at 689-90 (recognizing ILO’s “lack of power to punish labor
rights violations” or “enforce compliance” because of its limitation to moral force
and embarrassing publicity); Howse, supra note 101, at 167 (proposing that ILO
authorize trade sanctions but acknowledging that such an approach “would certainly
be diametrically opposed to the ILO tradition, which emphasizes diplomacy and
consensualism”).
257. See Howse, supra note 101, at 161-62 (observing that neither financial
inducements nor labeling programs appear superior to trade measures and
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policy option has its proponents, but none presents a clear and
258
Also, in the Asbestos report,
decisive tool to combat child labor.
the WTOAB showed its willingness to give more deference to
259
domestic trade policy decision-makers.
Because preventing child
labor is a “vital” public health objective, the means of realizing this
260
end will receive much less scrutiny. Thus, a WTO Panel performing
a balancing test would allow the imposition of sanctions under the
261
TDA.
2.

Subsequent practice authorizing limited use of unilateral extraterritorial
measures
The recent WTOAB decisions in Shrimp-Turtle suggest that an
import prohibition aimed at coercing other nations to enforce their
262
own child labor laws may now be justifiable. Before adoption of the
DSU and ordinary meaning analysis, the GATT Panels in the TunaDolphin cases ruled that unilateral measures could not be considered
263
“necessary” under Article XX(b).
The GATT Panelists reasoned
that these measures would unfairly coerce other nations into
264
adopting equivalent domestic policies.
According to the TunaDolphin GATT Panels, this domination would cause the multilateral
265
trading system to collapse.
In Shrimp-Turtle I, the earlier WTO Panel decision followed this
“slippery slope” rationale and reached the same result as the GATT

concluding that use of unilateral sanctions may be the most useful tool to combat
labor violations); Hudec, supra note 51, at 128 (“Once negotiation has been tried
and failed, trade restrictions will be necessary every time.”).
258. See supra notes 230-31, 257 and accompanying text (discussing possible
enforcement mechanisms).
259. See supra notes 199-206 and accompanying text (discussing effects of Asbestos
decision).
260. Id.
261. Cf. Charnovitz, Moral Exception, supra note 44, at 740-41 (hypothesizing that
an import ban of child labor products justified under “public morals” exception of
Article XX(a), and not the “public health” exception of a Article XX(b), would
survive the scrutiny of WTO Panel simply because of the gravity of child labor and
relevant international commitments). See generally supra note 44 and accompanying
text (explaining why this Comment supports Charnovitz’s thesis but, alternatively,
justifies the TDA under Article XX(b)).
262. See supra note 131 and accompanying text (discussing recent approvals of
trade-restrictive measures aimed at protecting human health and the environment).
263. Tuna-Dolphin II, supra note 85, para. 5.39.
264. See id. para. 5.38 (arguing that an interpretation of Article XX(b) which
would allow a nation to impose sanctions for the purposes of effecting change in
policies that come within the jurisdiction of other countries would hinder the
objectives of GATT).
265. See id. (noting that GATT objectives would be “seriously impaired” by a
unilateral measure).
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266

The WTOAB in Shrimp-Turtle I, however,
Tuna-Dolphin Panels.
267
strongly criticized the WTO Panel’s policy arguments. In that case,
the United States attempted to utilize Article XX(g) to justify an
import prohibition on shrimp caught without an American-issued
268
license.
The license mandated the use of technology designed to
269
avoid the inadvertent capture of endangered sea turtles.
The
WTOAB broadly approved of unilateral sanctions under Article
XX(g) but circumscribed their use depending on the nature of the
270
pursued objective.
Yet, it is noteworthy that no WTO dispute settlement body
construing Article XX(b) has explicitly approved of coercive
271
embargoes, such as the TDA.
In fact, both Tuna-Dolphin GATT
Panels in 1991 and 1994 ruled that Article XX(b) did not allow such
272
embargoes. Several factors suggest that the Tuna-Dolphin decisions
on extraterritorial measures are not fatal to the TDA under the WTO
system. The dynamic interpretive approach now emerging greatly
diverges from the approach prevalent in the Tuna-Dolphin
273
disputes.
The Tuna-Dolphin Panels’ reliance on drafting history
would severely weaken the decision in the eyes of a modern WTO
274
Most importantly, the GATT contracting parties never
panelist.
adopted the Tuna-Dolphin reports, conferring a secondary status on
275
their precedential value.

266. See AB Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 96, para. 7.61 (invalidating an
extraterritorial measures because it threatened the object and purpose of the
multilateral trading system).
267. See supra note 96 and accompanying text (citing WTOAB decisions where the
Panel failed to follow the essential sequence of steps for analyzing Article XX).
268. See AB Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 96, para. 3 (prohibiting the import of
shrimp from countries who have not proven that they pose no threat to endangered
turtles, either due to habitat or through modified fishing practices).
269. See id. paras. 4-5 (requiring foreign trawlers to adopt sea turtle protective
devices that are “comparable in effectiveness” to those in United States.).
270. See id. para. 186 (disapproving only of the application of Section 609 because
it constituted “arbitrary and unjustifiable discrimination,” but not its objective or
design).
271. See id. para. 133 (explicitly “not passing upon the question of whether there is
an implied jurisdictional limitation in Article XX(g) . . . [or] the nature or extent of
that limitation”). But see AB Shrimp-Turtle II, supra note 133, para. 153 (approving
implementation of Shrimp-Turtle I and allowing Members to unilaterally condition
market access on “comparably effective” environmental standards).
272. See supra note 185 and accompanying text (explaining the Tuna-Dolphin
decisions).
273. See supra notes 97-108 and accompanying text (discussing the contemporary
WTOAB interpretive approach).
274. See supra note 98 and accompanying text (explaining the WTO’s de-emphasis
of GATT drafting history).
275. See supra notes 94, 187 and accompanying text (differentiating between
adopted and unadopted GATT panel reports, like the unadopted Tuna-Dolphin
reports, and conferring somewhat greater precedential weight upon adopted
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The Tuna-Dolphin GATT Panels found an extraterritorial measure
inappropriate under Article XX(b), but appropriate under other
276
It is undisputed
Article XX exceptions, specifically Article XX(e).
that Article XX(e) permits an import ban on products due to their
277
Operating under a
production method—the labor of prisoners.
Vienna Convention contextual analysis, the Tuna-Dolphin Panels
might have reached the exact opposite conclusion evaluating Article
278
XX(b).
The recognized legitimacy of an Article XX(e) ban
demonstrates that Article XX itself permits extraterritorial
279
measures.
Under that rationale, Article XX(b) could justify a
similar ban on imports using production methods harmful to a
280
working child’s health.
Also, the adopted WTO Shrimp-Turtle I report allayed all of the
policy fears expressed by the Tuna-Dolphin GATT Panels regarding

reports).
276. See Tuna-Dolphin II, supra note 85, para. 5.32 (observing that measures could
be taken under different clauses of GATT that affect things or actions located
outside the territorial jurisdiction of the contracting party).
277. See Cheyne, supra note 182, at 461-62 (arguing that import restrictions of
prison labor products enacted pursuant to Article XX(e) are potentially protective
and coercive, but nonetheless accepted by GATT).
278. See Howse, supra note 101, at 143 (asserting that inclusion of Article XX(e)
regarding “the products of prison labour” in GATT infers that GATT contemplated
use of unilateral sanctions in pursuit social objectives under Article XX).
279. See supra note 277 and accompanying text (establishing that Article XX(e)
permits a unilateral import prohibition of prison labor-made goods).
280. See Charnovitz, Moral Exception, supra note 44, at 744 (expressing view that
Article XX(a) could justify outwardly-directed measures undertaken for “moral”
reasons, because moral and economic issues will be increasingly difficult to separate
in an interdependent global economy). The debate among scholars continues to
rage over whether Members can discriminate between products based on their
production method, rather than solely by their physical and other commercial
characteristics (the so-called “product-process” distinction). See generally Brandon L.
Bowen, The World Trade Organization and its Interpretation of the Article XX Exceptions to
the General Agreement on Tarifs and Trade, in Light of Recent Developments, 29 GA. J. INT’L
& COMP. L. 181, 188-89 (2000) (arguing that the product-process distinction
explicitly violates wording of GATT because Article XX provides several exceptions
that countries may undertake without violating the GATT); Frank J. Garcia, The
Global Market and Human Rights: Trading Away the Human Rights Principle, 25 BROOK. J.
INT’L L. 51 n.158 (1999) (concluding that product-process distinction would
effectively doom efforts to address human rights violations arising out of production
processes). Many commentators agree that the Shrimp-Turtle decision in particular
severely weakens the product-process distinction. See John A. Barrett, The Global
Environment and Free Trade: A Vexing Problem and a Taxing Solution, 76 IND. L.J. 829,
870 (2001) (arguing that Shrimp-Turtle permits discrimination between products
based on differences in production method, at least within Article XX(g)); John H.
Jackson, The Limits of International Trade: Workers’ Protection, the Environment and Other
Human Rights, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 222, 224 (2000) (suggesting that “the
product-process distinction will probably not survive and perhaps should not
survive”). Also refer to Robert E. Hudec, The Product-Process Doctrine in GATT/WTO
Jurisprudence, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR
OF JOHN H. JACKSON 187 (Marco Bronckers & Reinhard Quick eds., 2000), for a good
discussion of the ongoing debate.
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Although
the resilience of the multilateral trading system.
examining Article XX(g) and not Article XX(b), the WTOAB in
Shrimp-Turtle I found that a stringent Article XX chapeau analysis
282
would protect Members from coercive measures.
The Panels in
Shrimp-Turtle I, and in both Tuna-Dolphin disputes, worried that the
contested measures would abuse the rights of the complaining
283
parties. By comparison, the WTOAB in Shrimp-Turtle I suggested
that “conditioning access to a Member’s domestic market on whether
exporting Members comply with, or adopt, a policy or policies
unilaterally prescribed by the importing Member may . . . be a
common aspect of measures falling [under] . . . exceptions (a) to
284
(j) of Article XX.”
The Tuna-Dolphin GATT Panels blurred the line between a nondiscrimination analysis under the Article XX chapeau and a necessity
285
analysis under Article XX(b).
The WTOAB in Shrimp-Turtle I
286
performed these analyses separately. This separation may indicate
that WTO Panels will review the jurisdictional element of import
prohibitions under the Article XX chapeau prong, not specific
Article XX exceptions. In addition, the WTOAB in Asbestos showed
some willingness to allow unilateral sanctions under Article XX(b),
287
even though the French ban had no similarly coercive purpose.
Considering Shrimp-Turtle I, a logical WTO Panel might extend the
ruling in Asbestos to include import bans enacted to deter child labor
288
as long as the measure conforms to the Article XX chapeau.
Applying the current “necessity” test, the TDA would probably
survive the scrutiny of a WTO Panel. Child labor is a “vital” health

281. See AB Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 96, para. 156 (focusing on the object and
purpose of Article XX).
282. See id. (implying that a stringent Article XX chapeau analysis protects
complaining Members from coercive extraterritorial measures by preventing abuse
of another Member’s “right to invoke an exception” and thus avoids “devalu[ing] the
treaty rights of the other Members”).
283. See supra notes 192, 266 and accompanying text (explaining that any
countries without equal regulatory regimes would be unprotected).
284. AB Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 96, para. 121.
285. See Tuna-Dolphin I, supra note 85, para. 5.27 (relying on perceived threat to
multilateral trading system rather than looking at measure’s application); TunaDolphin II, supra note 85, para. 5.38 (claiming potential injury to basic objectives of
GATT and disregarding measure’s application).
286. See AB Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 96, paras. 125-45, 146-86 (granting
provisional justification to Section 609 under Article XX(g), but finding that the
United States discriminatorily applied the measure).
287. See supra notes 208-12 and accompanying text (noting the non-coercive
nature of the French measure but contending that future WTO panels might even
permit coercive measures).
288. See supra note 280 and accompanying text (concluding that a measure
deterring child labor might pass the Article XX(b) prong).
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risk and, under a balancing approach, domestic policymakers should
289
No reasonably available
be given wide deference to combat it.
alternatives to unilateral sanctions appear to be “sufficiently
290
effective.”
Allowing unilateral sanctions based on impermissible
production methods, such as child labor, will not destroy the
291
multilateral trading system.
The drafting history of Article XX(b)
plays a supplementary role and does not exclude the use of unilateral
292
Furthermore, the WTO Preamble
and extraterritorial sanctions.
objective of raising standards of living permits the pursuit of properly
293
delimited social objectives.
Thus, the design of the TDA should
achieve provisional justification as a valid Article XX(b) exception.
IV. STEP TWO: THE TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT ACT COMPLIES WITH
THE CHAPEAU OF ARTICLE XX
When properly applied and enforced, the TDA would adequately
comply with the Article XX chapeau. To do so, measures must not
discriminate arbitrarily or unjustifiably or act as disguised restrictions
294
on trade.
WTO Panels locate an “equilibrium line” between a
Member’s right to invoke an Article XX exception and another
295
Member’s substantive GATT rights.
The two WTO Shrimp-Turtle decisions form the framework for
296
compliance with the Article XX chapeau. Responding to a claim by
Malaysia, the WTOAB in Shrimp-Turtle I explicitly applied the
chapeau test to a U.S. extraterritorial and coercive trade measure,
297
Section 609. The chapeau contemplates three potential violations:

289. See discussion supra Part III.A (noting that researchers, policymakers, and the
international community acknowledge existence of health risk and suggesting
integration of the WTO preamble’s goal of “raising standards of living”).
290. See supra notes 257, 261 and accompanying text (suggesting that the
inefficiency of financial inducements and labeling programs may render unilateral
sanctions the most effective tool available).
291. See supra notes 280-81 and accompanying text (asserting that unilateral
sanctions may survive Article XX(b) scrutiny and that the multilateral trading system
is resilient enough to withstand them).
292. See supra note 274 and accompanying text (contending that larger role of
GATT drafting history would conflict with views of modern WTO Panelists).
293. See discussion supra Part III.A.3 (suggesting that “raising standards of living”
should be incorporated into interpretation of Article XX).
294. See supra note 127 and accompanying text (listing three ways in which a
measure may not be applied).
295. See AB Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 96, para. 159 (preventing competing
Member rights from canceling each other out or distorting and nullifying the
delicate balance of rights and obligations).
296. See id. para. 156 (proscribing a balancing of Members’ rights and
obligations); see also AB Shrimp-Turtle II, supra note 133, para. 153 (clarifying first
Shrimp-Turtle standards and emphasizing efforts at international negotiation and
due process in application of trade-restrictive measures).
297. AB Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 96, para. 160 (interpreting chapeau standards
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unjustifiable discrimination, arbitrary discrimination, and disguised
298
The WTOAB examined the measure’s
restriction on trade.
application, not its design, and found that the United States did not
299
satisfy the Article XX chapeau.
Following the Shrimp-Turtle I decision, the United States reformed
300
its application of Section 609.
In response, Malaysia filed another
WTO claim against the United States, arguing that the United States
had
not
effectively
implemented
the
Shrimp-Turtle
I
301
recommendations and ruling.
Evaluating the implementation,
both the WTO Panel and WTOAB concurred that the Section 609
302
revised application overcame and remedied its previous flaws.
In both instances, the WTOAB’s analysis focused on three features
of the application of Section 609 by the United States: the degree of
flexibility in standard-setting, the extent of cooperative negotiations,
303
and the level of procedural protection given to applicants.
Applying the Shrimp-Turtle decisions to TDA, the TDA and Section
307 will be found to comply with the Article XX chapeau because the
United States allows for flexibility in compliance standards,
constructively engaged Pakistan in negotiations, and ensures basic
304
procedural fairness.
To further improve its likelihood of passing
the chapeau test, the United States should allow Pakistan some time
to comply with the TDA while continuing to finance Pakistani
enforcement efforts.
A. Standards Used by the Customs Service are Sufficiently Flexible
The TDA avoids the inflexibility problems that plagued the U.S.
305
law in Shrimp-Turtle.
In that case, the original 1996 Guidelines

as both procedural and substantive requirements for proper use and application of
an Article XX exception).
298. Id. para. 150.
299. See id. para. 186 (legitimizing import prohibition serving environmental
purpose and implying that United States could employ Section 609 if applied
properly); see also supra note 105 and accompanying text (distinguishing between
analysis of a measure’s design and its application).
300. See AB Shrimp-Turtle II, supra note 133, paras. 4-8 (setting out provisions of
the U.S. Revised Guidelines, which allow nations to avoid import prohibitions if they
are properly certified by the United States).
301. Id. para. 1.
302. See id. para. 153 (approving Revised Guidelines as long as good faith efforts to
reach a multilateral agreement continue and other conditions remain satisfied).
303. See id. paras. 134, 148 (rejecting Malaysian contentions that the United States
must conclude a multilateral agreement and permit even more flexibility in its
Revised Guidelines); AB Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 96, paras. 173, 178, 182
(objecting to U.S. application of Section 609 based on problems with phase-in
period, flexible approach to certification, and due process).
304. See discussion infra Part IV.A-C.
305. See supra note 303 and accompanying text (discussing the WTOAB’s analysis
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and State Department administrators conditioned the granting of
import licenses on an applicant’s adoption of turtle-safe fishing
306
The WTOAB in
methods “essentially the same” as U.S. methods.
Shrimp-Turtle I found unjustifiable discrimination because the
307
The
United States provided little flexibility to applicant nations.
308
design of Section 609 did not discriminate on its face, but the 1996
Guidelines left no room for gauging the varying conditions in other
309
countries.
After Shrimp-Turtle I, the United States issued a set of revised
310
These guidelines allowed
Section 609 guidelines on certification.
harvesting nations to show a regulatory program “comparable in
311
effectiveness.”
According to Malaysia, the Revised Section 609
312
guidelines still failed to account for regional fishing methods. The
WTOAB in the new Shrimp-Turtle case distinguished between
conditioning market access on adoption of “essentially the same”
313
policies rather than programs “comparable in effectiveness.”
The
latter standard gave applicants “sufficient latitude” to choose an
equally efficacious measure that accounts for specific country
314
conditions.
The WTOAB found that the “comparably effective”
315
standard did not discriminate unjustifiably.
Examining the TDA’s flexibility, a WTO Panel would scrutinize the
standards used by the U.S. Customs Service (“Customs”) to decide
316
which child labor imports to prohibit. Customs bases its findings of

in Shrimp-Turtle regarding the United States’ application of Section 609).
306. See AB Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 96, paras. 162-63 (focusing on State
Department administrators who, in practice, did not perform rigorous investigations
of fishing methods and local conditions of applicant countries and rarely granted
licenses).
307. See id. para. 165 (mandating that Members consider “appropriateness of the
regulatory program for the conditions prevailing in those exporting countries”).
308. See id. para. 162 (remarking that 1996 Guidelines required administrators to
account for “measures the harvesting nation undertakes to protect sea turtles,” but
that administrators frequently only looked at whether applicant countries used the
exact same technology as United States).
309. See supra note 307 and accompanying text (remarking that the United States
took no account of conditions in countries applying for Section 609 licenses).
310. See supra note 300 and accompanying text (detailing U.S. Revised
Guidelines).
311. See AB Shrimp-Turtle II, supra note 133, para. 144 (authorizing importing
Member to condition market access on passage of comparably effective regulatory
schemes by exporting Members and finding that exporting Members receive
“sufficient latitude”).
312. See id. para. 145 (characterizing oversight by United States as “unjustifiable or
arbitrary discrimination”).
313. Id. para. 144.
314. Id.
315. See id. para. 148 (confirming that the Revised Guidelines gave Malaysia the
opportunity to conform as a result of the increased degree of flexibility).
316. See U.S. CUSTOMS SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FORCED CHILD LABOR
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forced or indentured child labor on a range of indicators—serious
317
Some “red flags”
“red flags” and less conclusive “yellow flags.”
include employment to discharge a debt, employer penalties that
318
increase indebtedness, and the presence of very young children.
These indicators strongly resemble those used by the ILO and by
Pakistan’s own Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act of 1992
319
(“BLSAA”).
The persistence of child labor indicators in Pakistan stems from
320
inadequate enforcement.
By utilizing the TDA, the United States
would not require that Pakistan adopt “essentially the same” child
321
Rather,
labor laws or enforcement regimes as the United States.
Customs prohibits entry of child labor products based on objective
measurements and not on the design of the applicant nation’s child
322
labor program.
In fact, Pakistan’s BLSAA could become an
323
acceptable solution if comparable in effectiveness to U.S. programs.

ADVISORY 5-8 (2000) [hereinafter CUSTOMS CHILD LABOR MANUAL] (ordering Customs
officials to seek documentary evidence regarding “red flag” indicators or less serious
“yellow flag” indicators of forced child labor being used in production of U.S.
imports).
317. See id. at 6-8 (explaining that “red flags” show strong indication of basis for
Customs enforcement action while “yellow flags” signal need to investigate further).
318. Id. at 6-7.
319. See Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act of 1992 (defining “bonded
labourer” as a “labourer who incurs, or has or is presumed to have incurred, a
bonded debt. . .”) [hereinafter BLSAA], reprinted in All Pakistan Federation of
Labour, Bonded Brick Kiln Workers—1989 Supreme Court Judgment and After, at
http://www.icftu.org (last visited Feb. 14, 2002). This law frees Pakistani brick kiln
workers from (i) the staggering burden of advances, and (ii) deductions made from
their wages every week on account of these advances. Id.
320. See U.S. Dep’t of State, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor,
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Pakistan (2001) (confirming that handmade
bricks are likely produced with forced or indentured child labor and that provincial
governments responsible for enforcing BLSAA have failed), available at
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/sa/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 14,
2002); see also International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, Report for the WTO
General Council Review of Trade Policies of Pakistan (2002) [hereinafter ICFTU Pakistan
Report] (citing a national policy and action plan produced by Pakistani Government
but
remarking
that
enforcement
remains
minimal), available at
http://www.icftu.org/list.asp?Language=EN&Order=Date&Type=WTOReports&Subj
ect=ILS (last visited Feb. 14, 2002).
321. See CUSTOMS CHILD LABOR MANUAL, supra note 316, at 6-7 (failing to mention
adequacy of enforcement mechanisms, but simply referring to observable
indicators).
322. See id. (discussing objective measures which include slave labor conditions,
evidence of physical or sexual abuse of child workers at the workplace, and
employment of very young children).
323. See supra note 321 and accompanying text (noting that Customs merely
requires that countries do not exhibit indicators of child labor, not that they adopt
specific policies); see also AB Shrimp-Turtle II, supra note 133, para. 147 (stating that
Revised Guidelines permit State Department to certify nations that use fishing
methods that do “not pose a threat of the incidental taking of sea turtles”). By
comparison, if Pakistani child labor enforcement methods do not pose a threat to
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Pakistan has already set up “vigilance committees” to implement the
324
BLSAA’s strict penalties. But, thus far, the BLSAA remains largely
unimplemented and the vigilance committees are plagued by
325
corruption and a lack of political will.
Therefore, the Pakistani
326
programs have been largely ineffective. Because Customs requires
only an initiative comparable in effectiveness, the TDA lacks the
327
faults of Section 609 in the Shrimp-Turtle case.
Also, Customs policy provides additional flexibility. The TDA is
not a licensing program; rather, it determines forced child labor
328
violations on a case-by-case basis.
In Shrimp-Turtle I, Malaysia
argued convincingly that Section 609 improperly prohibited turtlesafe shrimp solely because trawlers caught them in the waters of
329
unlicensed countries.
With the TDA, only Pakistani brick-makers
employing children will be denied market access rather than all
Pakistani brick-makers, some who may have legitimate labor
330
practices. Because Customs uses “comparable effectiveness” criteria
and reviews cases individually, the TDA is not unjustifiably
331
discriminatory.
B. The United States Has Made a Good Faith Effort
to Negotiate with Pakistan
The United States can legitimately state that it engaged its trading
partners in negotiations on child labor because it has signed two
332
In contrast, the United
major multilateral treaties on the subject.

the health and welfare of children, the Customs Service regulations would permit the
import of the products of such labor. See id. (according due weight to national
programs of shrimp importers).
324. BLSAA, supra note 319, foreword, para 2.
325. See id. (remarking that many vigilance committees have still yet to form, while
others have yet to find a single instance of bonded child labor despite prevalent
anecdotal evidence).
326. See id. (summarizing that rules and laws of land have been disregarded
because of prevalent corruption and bad governance); ICFTU Pakistan Report, supra
note 320 (estimating that Pakistani courts have turned away over 2000 cases brought
by bonded laborers).
327. See CUSTOMS CHILD LABOR MANUAL, supra note 316, at 6-7 (not prescribing
mandatory program for enforcing child labor laws).
328. See id. at 6 (warning importers that particular “red flags” indicate high risk
that their products will be prohibited from entering the United States).
329. See supra notes 308-10 and accompanying text (summarizing decision in
original Shrimp-Turtle I decision).
330. See supra note 328 and accompanying text (noting that labor practices that
are “red flagged” will prevent the improperly-produced goods from being imported
into the United States).
331. See supra notes 327, 328 and accompanying text (highlighting why Section
609 failed and why the TDA will receive WTOAB approval).
332. See ILO 182 Ratifications, supra note 41 (ratified by United States on Feb. 12,
1999 and by Pakistan on Nov. 10, 2001); UN Child Convention Ratifications, supra
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States in Shrimp-Turtle I consummated an Inter-American
333
The Convention
Convention with only one group of importers.
stipulated the comparable fishing methods that complied with
334
Section 609.
After completing this agreement, the United States
began enforcing the shrimp ban worldwide and transferring
335
technology to its new partners. The United States did not seek an
agreement with the complaining Members, however, and provided
336
The
them much less time to phase in the necessary technology.
WTOAB ruled that Members should seriously engage all relevant
parties in bilateral or multilateral negotiations before enforcing an
337
import ban.
Members should also make other efforts to facilitate
338
compliance, such as technology transfer.
After Shrimp-Turtle I, the State Department held a number of
conferences to fashion an agreement among Asian nations on turtle339
safe fishing methods. Malaysia claimed that the United States must
340
The
produce an agreement, not merely engage in negotiations.
WTO Panel and WTOAB in the second Shrimp-Turtle decision
disagreed and found that a Member should be “judged on its active
341
participation and its financial support to the negotiations.”
The
342
U.S. efforts at negotiations complied with this determination.
When looking at the TDA and the adequacy of U.S. negotiations, a
WTO Panel would assess the participation of the U.S. and Pakistan in

note 41 (ratified by United States on Feb. 16, 1995 and by Pakistan on Nov. 12,
1990).
333. See AB Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 96, para. 169 (providing that each party
take “appropriate and necessary measures” for protection of sea turtles, thus marking
out a formal equilibrium line between environmental and trade objectives).
334. See id. para. 170-71 (demonstrating that the United States could have
negotiated a similarly consensual and multilateral agreement to establish sea turtle
conservation procedures).
335. See id. para. 175 (chastising the United States for providing different levels of
effort in transferring turtle-safe technology to specific countries).
336. See id. para. 173 (giving Caribbean and Western Atlantic nations three years
to comply with compulsory turtle-excluder device requirement while giving all other
countries exporting shrimp, including India, Malaysia, Pakistan and Thailand, only
four months).
337. See id. para. 172 (noting that the unilateral element of Section 609’s
application “heightens [its] disruptive and discriminatory” nature).
338. See id. para. 175 (explaining that less transfer of technology prejudices
Members’ attempts at certification).
339. See AB Shrimp-Turtle II, supra note 133, para. 131 (noting that the United
States proposed a regional sea turtle convention to South-East Asian nations, led a
symposium in Malaysia, attended a conference in Australia, and conducted an initial
round of negotiations on an Asian regional agreement).
340. See id. para. 116 (illustrating the Malaysian position that serious, good faith
efforts at negotiations are insufficient).
341. Id. para. 132.
342. Id. para. 134.
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343

The ILO’s International Program on the Elimination of
the ILO.
Child Labor (“IPEC”) conducted an intensive project to eradicate
344
Pakistani child labor between 1995 and 1997. The U.S. Department
345
of Labor provided critical funding for the project. Additionally, the
United States remains the largest donor to the ILO general budget,
346
and to the IPEC budget in particular.
Despite U.S. and
international support, Pakistan continually fails to enforce its child
347
labor laws.
The United States and Pakistan agreed to design, implement, and
enforce measures to eliminate the worst forms of child labor by
348
The existence of these
signing ILO 182 and the UN Convention.
labor agreements is in direct contrast with Shrimp-Turtle I, where the
United States failed to negotiate or reach a joint determination with
349
Malaysia regarding turtle-safe fishing methods.
In this example,
Pakistan and the United States have jointly determined that child
350
bondage and compulsory child labor are not permissible.
Nonetheless, the application of the TDA to Pakistan may still
discriminate unjustifiably. The United States must notify Pakistan of
its intention to strictly enforce the TDA while continuing to support
351
IPEC programs in Pakistan.
In Shrimp-Turtle I, the United States

343. See id. para. 122 (concluding that the United States must “provide all
countries similar opportunities to negotiate an international agreement,” stopping
short of producing an agreement).
344. See CEACR: Individual Observation concerning Convention No. 29, Forced
Labour, 1930 Pakistan (ratification: 1957), International Labour Conference, 88th
Sess. (2000) (expressing dissatisfaction with Pakistani government because it
provided no information on progress and results of IPEC program or ILO project to
eliminate exploitative and hazardous child labor practices), available at
http://www.ilo.org/ilc (last visited Feb. 14, 2002).
345. See U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Int’l Labor Affairs, International Child
Labor Projects (donating over $112.1 million to IPEC between 1995 and 2001, with
steady increase), available at http://www.dol.gov/dol/ilab/public/programs/
iclp/projects.htm (last visited Apr. 13, 2002).
346. See supra notes 252-53 and accompanying text (demonstrating that the
United States is the largest donor to both the ILO and the IPEC).
347. See supra notes 320, 325-26 and accompanying text (noting the ineffectiveness
of Pakistan’s implementation of its child labor laws).
348. See ILO 182, supra note 13, art. 3(a), 3(d) (committing signatories to prohibit
and eliminate child slave labor, child debt bondage, and work harmful to the health
and safety of children); UN Child Convention, supra note 13, art. 32(1) (requiring
parties to the Convention to protect children from work that is likely to harm a
child’s health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development); see also
supra note 332 and accompanying text (indicating the date of ratification to both
multilateral treaties by the United States and Pakistan).
349. See supra notes 334-39 and accompanying text (discussing the United States’
failure to engage in negotiations with the complaining Members in Shrimp-Turtle I).
350. See ILO 182, supra note 13, art. 3(a) (prohibiting child debt bondage by
parties to the agreement).
351. See AB Shrimp-Turtle II, supra note 133, para. 132 (praising the United
States’ efforts to provide financial support).
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did not grant Malaysia a phase-in period or technical support before
352
banning its imports. With the TDA, the United States must provide
Pakistan a fair warning and a fair opportunity to comply with the law.
If this is done, a WTO Panel will likely find that the United States
353
satisfies the negotiations requirement of the Article XX chapeau.
C. Customs Service Determinations are Transparent and Afford Due Process
The TDA would also likely meet the final requirement under the
354
chapeau—the provision of basic procedural protections.
The
United States in Shrimp-Turtle I rejected licenses without providing
Malaysia a forum to be heard, notification of review, a detailed
355
explanation, or an opportunity to appeal.
In contrast, the nations
356
certified by the United States received these protections.
The
WTOAB found that, because the American procedures lacked
transparency and due process, the application of Section 609 could
357
be characterized as arbitrary discrimination.
In complying with Shrimp-Turtle I, the U.S. Section 609 Revised
Guidelines more explicitly instructed the Department of State to
358
consider the different conditions existing in the applicant country.
Also, the United States agreed to provide notice of steps needed for
359
certification and the opportunity to submit additional information.
The WTOAB eventually approved of the due process revisions by the
360
United States.

352. See supra notes 334-45 and accompanying text (addressing the major errors by
the United States in Shrimp-Turtle I).
353. See supra note 307 and accompanying text (identifying the three features laid
out by the WTOAB in its analysis of section 609 in Shrimp-Turtle, the second being
the extent of cooperative negotiations).
354. See, e.g., AB Shrimp-Turtle II, supra note 133, para. 147 (commenting on the
United States’ revised approach to Section 609 certification that gives applicant
nations specific and timely notification and opportunity to submit additional
information for consideration).
355. See AB Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 96, para. 180 (describing the procedure as
lacking a transparent, predictable certification process that is followed by competent
United States government officials).
356. See id. para. 181 (asserting that Members who apply but fail to get certified
are denied basic fairness and due process, and are discriminated against while
successful applicant Members are treated more fairly).
357. See id. paras. 182-84 (finding that the lack of transparency and the failure to
provide adequate due process makes the application of Section 609 both
unjustifiably and arbitrarily discriminatory).
358. See AB Shrimp-Turtle II, supra note 133, para. 147 (including provisions in
the Revised Guidelines for reception of evidence regarding comparably effective
turtle-safe fishing methods as well as any other measures the applicant country takes
to protect sea turtles, including protection of nesting beaches and other programs).
359. See id. (indicating that an applicant country that “does not appear to qualify”
will receive feedback addressing its shortcomings and will be provided with
suggestive steps to help the country become certified).
360. See id. para. 153 (holding that the Revised Guidelines are in compliance and
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When applying the TDA, the Commissioner of Customs may
initiate a Section 307 investigation when an officer reasonably
361
After
believes that a class of merchandise should be prohibited.
362
considering comments from foreign officials, Customs provides
363
adequate notice of its decision and an opportunity for review. The
lack of such procedures proved fatal to Section 609 in Shrimp364
Turtle. Because Customs affords ample due process, the TDA will
365
be justifiable under the Article XX chapeau.
Comparing the application of the TDA with Section 609 in ShrimpTurtle, the Customs Service’s method of enforcing the TDA, on its
366
Customs uses a
face, lacks the deficiencies that beset Section 609.
flexible standard by basing its “red flag” indicators on international
norms and allowing comparably effective approaches to eliminating
367
child labor.
The United States has consummated a child labor
treaty with Pakistan while funding efforts to improve Pakistani
368
enforcement.
Lastly, Customs regulations provide fair procedures
369
for WTO Members.
Of course, the United States has yet to take any action under the
370
It is, therefore, impossible to firmly
TDA against Pakistan.
conclude that the United States would satisfy the chapeau in all
situations. The Customs Service might ignore its own regulations or,
371
in some way, divest them of their facial conformity.
For instance,

justified under Article XX).
361. See Findings of Commissioner of Customs, 19 C.F.R. § 12.42(e) (2001)
(granting the Commissioner authority to determine whether there is enough
information that reasonably, but not conclusively, indicates that merchandise violates
Section 307).
362. See id. § 12.42(d) (instructing Commissioner to consider “any representations
offered by foreign interests, importers, domestic producers, or other interested
persons”).
363. See id. § 12.42(f), (g) (directing the Commissioner to publish his or her
finding in a weekly issue of the Customs Bulletin and the Federal Register, and
providing importers an opportunity to present rebuttal evidence).
364. See supra notes 359-62 and accompanying text (outlining Customs procedures
for identifying and prohibiting child labor products).
365. See AB Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 96, para. 182 (requiring fundamental due
process, including notice, adequate explanation, and an opportunity to be heard).
366. See supra notes 303-04 and accompanying text (highlighting the WTOAB’s
reasoning for invalidating Section 609 in Shrimp-Turtle).
367. See supra notes 316-18 and accompanying text (discussing the the Customs
standard).
368. See supra note 348 and accompanying text (addressing the negotiations
between Pakistan and the United States).
369. See supra notes 355-48 and accompanying text (discussing the presence of
adequate due process).
370. See Customs Detention Orders, supra note 28 (failing to mention Pakistan as a
target of TDA action).
371. See AB Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 96, para. 161 (striking down Section 609
because State Department administrators did not adhere to their own enumerated
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Customs could interpret its “red flag” indicators in an extreme or
372
In the alternative, the Customs Service may
prejudicial fashion.
373
overzealously target a certain nation for unrelated political reasons.
Assuming good faith by Customs, the application of the TDA to
Pakistan, as a theoretical example, will likely adhere to the chapeau
374
of Article XX.
By giving additional financing and a reasonable
375
the United States can apply the TDA with
phase-in period,
assurance that a WTO Panel would ratify its decision.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Few nations would disagree that the labor undertaken by Seema
376
and other children in Pakistan must cease immediately. The fact is,
however, that Pakistan and other Members lack the political will to
377
enforce their own child labor laws. This offers little relief to Seema
and her peers. The U.S. Trade and Development Act of 2000 likely
378
represents an efficient option to encourage enforcement.
By
necessity, however, the United States must depart from its WTO
379
commitments to Pakistan or any other Member. This departure is
contemplated by GATT Article XX(b), which allows for derogation
from commitments when nations are acting to protect human life or
380
health.


guidelines).
372. See generally Kelleher, supra note 220, at 165-66 (showing that informal GSP
status hearing procedures can be broadly interpreted and, as a result, can confer
inordinate discretion upon executive officials).
373. See Davis, supra note 230, at 1175 (asserting that GSP revocation process can
be “highly politicized”).
374. See discussion supra Part IV.A-C (noting that the application of the TDA to
Pakistan will likely comply with the Article XX chapeau because the Customs Service
standards are flexible, the United States has made a good faith effort to negotiate
with Pakistan, and Customs Service determinations are fair and afford due process).
375. Supra notes 335-39 and accompanying text.
376. See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text (describing the harsh labor
practices in Pakistan through the story of nine-year old Seema).
377. See ICFTU Pakistan Report, supra note 320 (remarking that enforcement of
child labor laws in Pakistan remains ineffective due to an insufficient number of
inspectors, minimal training, and vast corruption).
378. See supra notes 292-96 and accompanying text (noting that the TDA will
probably be upheld by the WTO because child labor is a “vital” health risk, there do
not seem to be any reasonable alternatives to sanctions that would be “sufficiently
effective,” and allowing such sanctions will not destroy the “multilateral trading
system”).
379. See supra notes 78-80 and accompanying text (asserting that the import ban
proposed by the TDA could trigger a violation of GATT articles I, XI, and XII).
380. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text (outlining the object and
purpose of Article XX).
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Interpreting Article XX(b), the WTOAB first looks to the disputed
381
The
measure’s health-related objective and then to its design.
382
measure must be necessary to effect its policy objective. To combat
child labor, a majority of the countries in the international
community adopted the standards established by the ILO and the
383
United Nations. Such consensus gives domestic policymakers more
384
leeway in deciding how to remedy the health menace of child labor.
A unilateral import prohibition should be among the available
385
policymaking tools.
To deter developed countries from coercing compliance, the
Article XX chapeau tests the application of measures for
386
discrimination and protectionism.
Before enforcing a trade
restrictive measure, a Member must attempt to negotiate an
387
In
agreement and properly ensure due process in enforcement.
the U.S.-Pakistan hypothetical, both nations have committed by treaty
388
to eliminate the worst forms of child labor.
The TDA would
provide all Members with compliance guidelines, notice of potential
389
enforcement, and opportunity to comment.
Nonetheless, application of the TDA conforms to the Article XX
chapeau only in certain factual settings. A hypothetical TDA
390
enforcement against Pakistan is but one example.
Other WTO
391
Members have yet to ratify the ILO conventions on child labor.

381. See generally discussion supra Part III.
382. See discussion supra Part III.B (arguing that the import prohibition allowed by
the TDA is necessary to accomplish the end of eradicating child labor).
383. See supra note 41 and accompanying text (remarking that 113 countries
ratified ILO 182 and 192 countries ratified the UN Child Convention).
384. See supra note 206 (arguing that the Asbestos balancing approach gives more
deference to policymakers regarding measures that protect human health).
385. See Howse, supra note 101, at 161-62 (maintaining that the use of unilateral
sanctions is a useful policy tool). But see Iftikhar Ahmed, Getting Rid of Child Labour,
ILO/IPEC Working Paper, 32, at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/
ipec/simpoc/index.htm (2000) (condemning use of sanctions to coerce action on
child labor as “hasty, ad hoc, often negative”) (last visited Feb. 14, 2002).
386. See supra note 282 and accompanying text (concluding that the Article XX
chapeau protects Members against discriminatorily applied measures, particularly
coercive and extraterritorial measures).
387. See supra notes 343, 357 and accompanying text (discussing the good faith
negotiations requirement first articulated in the Shrimp-Turtle case).
388. See supra note 332 and accompanying text (providing the dates that both the
United States and Pakistan signed the ILO and UN Child Convention).
389. See supra notes 362-64 and accompanying text (detailing Customs procedures
for enforcing the TDA).
390. See discussion supra Part IV.A-C (noting that the TDA complies with the
Article XX chapeau when adequately “applied and enforced”).
391. See ILO 182 Ratifications, supra note 41 (list of ILO 182 non-signatories);
World Trade Organization, List of Members and Observers (noting that 41 of ILO
182 non-signatories are also WTO Members), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last updated Jan. 1, 2002).
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With those Members, the United States must negotiate separately
392
Also, some Members may exhibit far
before enforcing the TDA.
393
fewer indicators of abusive child labor.
In these situations, the
United States could not justify a TDA action as readily.
The design of the TDA should pass an Article XX(b) challenge. In
contrast, the application of the TDA will probably comply with the
Article XX chapeau only if Customs stringently abides by its own
regulations. To improve the likelihood of compliance, the United
States should take certain additional steps.
First and most
importantly, the United States must allow an appropriate phase-in
period while financially assisting other nations’ enforcement
394
initiatives.
Also, the U.S. Trade Representative might consider an
oversight program to ensure the equitable administration of the
395
TDA.
Regardless of the preparations undertaken by the United States,
some WTO Members may claim that the TDA is disguised
protectionism. To address this, the United States should consider
396
repealing the “consumptive demand” exception of Section 307.
This clause allows the import of prohibited goods when similar goods
are insufficiently produced in the U.S. domestic market to meet
397
consumer demand.
Eliminating the “consumptive demand”
exception would negate any possible claim that the purpose of
Section 307 is really to protect American consumers and industries

392. See AB Shrimp-Turtle II, supra note 133, para. 122 (mandating that Members
attempt to negotiate agreement on equilibrium line between policy objective and
WTO rights of other Members in absence of existing agreement).
393. See supra notes 325-26, 344 and accompanying text (using Pakistani bonded
child labor indicators as extreme example of abusive child labor practices).
394. See discussion supra Part IV.B.
395. See Garg, supra note 12, at 500-01 (lamenting poor oversight of GSP
procedures that some contend have disregarded blatant labor rights violations in
developing countries).
396. See Socially Responsible Consumers’ Choice and Anti-Child Labor Act, S.
1353, 107th Cong. § 2(a) (2001) (striking language in the second sentence of
Section 307 of the Tariff Act of 1930 (19 U.S.C. § 1307) stating, “but in no case shall
such provisions be applicable to goods . . . not mined, produced, or manufactured
in such quantities in the United States as to meet the consumptive demands of the
United States”); see also WTO Panel Report on United States—Import Prohibition of
Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by
Malaysia, WT/DS58/RW, para. 5.142 (June 15, 2001) [hereinafter Shrimp-Turtle
Panel II] (determining whether design of measure provided disguised protection
available
at
beyond
level
associated
with
imposition
of
ban),
http://docsonline.wto.org (last visited Feb. 14, 2002).
397. See Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1307 (2000); China Diesel Imp., Inc. v.
United States, 870 F. Supp. 347, 350 (Ct. Int’l Trade 1994) (rejecting the United
States’ contention that “mere production capability” may defeat the consumptive
demand exception, and holding instead that a product must be available in the
domestic industry).
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398

instead of the world’s working children.
If the United States embraces these recommendations, a WTO
Panel would uphold the TDA prohibition of child labor imports as an
Article XX exception. Such a Panel ruling may finally compel WTO
Members to address child labor more seriously and explicitly than
399
they did at the Singapore Ministerial Conference. Once the WTO
as a whole concretizes a plan for enforcing trade-related labor rights,
the multilateral trading community may finally offer child workers of
the world the opportunity to develop into healthy and productive
adults.


398. See Shrimp-Turtle Panel II, supra note 396, para. 5.143 (finding no “disguised
restriction on international trade” because the United States proved that no part of
Section 609 gave American fishermen any commercial gain over foreign fishermen).
399. But see DSU, supra note 37, art. 3(2) (“Recommendations and rulings of the
Dispute Settlement Body cannot add or diminish the rights and obligations provided
in the covered agreements.”). By approving Section 609 in Shrimp-Turtle, the
Appellate Body implicitly countered the argument that allowing coercive and/or
extraterritorial sanctions for an environmental purpose “diminish[es] the rights” of
Members. AB Shrimp-Turtle I, supra note 96, para. 186. Applying an evolutionary
definition of “human health,” a WTO Panel should reach the same conclusion
regarding coercive and extraterritorial sanctions for a human health purpose. See id.
para. 129 (applying an evolutionary definition of “exhaustible natural resources”).

